IETF Logo Mail Archive

Re: [keyassure] crypto hash alg deprecation is a myth

Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com> Thu, 03 March 2011 14:33 UTC

Return-Path: <ajs@shinkuro.com>
X-Original-To: keyassure@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: keyassure@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1F37D3A6964 for <keyassure@core3.amsl.com>; Thu, 3 Mar 2011 06:33:12 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -102.606
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-102.606 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.007, BAYES_00=-2.599, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id TjF8cc7W5oXQ for <keyassure@core3.amsl.com>; Thu, 3 Mar 2011 06:33:11 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail.yitter.info (mail.yitter.info [208.86.224.201]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4D2543A67E7 for <keyassure@ietf.org>; Thu, 3 Mar 2011 06:33:11 -0800 (PST)
Received: from crankycanuck.ca (69-196-144-230.dsl.teksavvy.com [69.196.144.230]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.yitter.info (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 3ABA71ECB41D for <keyassure@ietf.org>; Thu, 3 Mar 2011 14:34:18 +0000 (UTC)
Date: Thu, 03 Mar 2011 09:34:16 -0500
From: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com>
To: keyassure@ietf.org
Message-ID: <20110303143415.GE51215@shinkuro.com>
References: <201103030509.p2359FSK025866@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp> <201103030746.53024.rob.stradling@comodo.com> <AANLkTimgvJ5G4NystNrBUXdq2rNkp8THC1tPGQEfV97T@mail.gmail.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Disposition: inline
In-Reply-To: <AANLkTimgvJ5G4NystNrBUXdq2rNkp8THC1tPGQEfV97T@mail.gmail.com>
User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.18 (2008-05-17)
Subject: Re: [keyassure] crypto hash alg deprecation is a myth
X-BeenThere: keyassure@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Key Assurance With DNSSEC <keyassure.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyassure>, <mailto:keyassure-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/keyassure>
List-Post: <mailto:keyassure@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:keyassure-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/keyassure>, <mailto:keyassure-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 03 Mar 2011 14:33:12 -0000

On Thu, Mar 03, 2011 at 08:57:04AM -0500, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
> 
> One of the very few signals available that is listened to is to stop
> supporting old algorithms in new protocols.

But as I think Warren said upthread, we simply don't need to list the
protocols we don't want _at all_.  Then they're not supported from the
get go.  We don't need to talk about algorithms we don't want to
support.

The key thing, I think we all agree, is to make sure algorithm change
can happen.  This is an area where DNSSEC is still somewhat less than
perfect, for instance.

A

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@shinkuro.com
Shinkuro, Inc.

v2.23.0 | Report a Bug | By Email