Re: [keyassure] Musing on design based on proposed use cases

"Richard L. Barnes" <rbarnes@bbn.com> Wed, 30 March 2011 12:45 UTC

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Date: Wed, 30 Mar 2011 14:46:55 +0200
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To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
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Subject: Re: [keyassure] Musing on design based on proposed use cases
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>> So the proposed validation algorithm would have roughly the following form:
>> A. Given a set of DANE records and a cert chain...
>> B. Verify that all DANE certs with the "critical" flag set are present in the cert chain
> 
> This seems problematic. Say what I'm trying to do is cert lock and I
> have multiple servers,
> each with its own cert. If I list all the certs, this will obvious break.

Fair enough.  Could also be "Verify that at least one DANE CA cert with the "critical" flag set is present in the cert chain".  Assuming that you never want to specify more than one cert in the chain (I don't see why you would).

--Richard