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Re: [keyassure] Opening issue #21: "Need to specify which crypto

Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> Wed, 09 March 2011 00:16 UTC

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Subject: Re: [keyassure] Opening issue #21: "Need to specify which crypto
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On 3/8/11 3:48 PM, Peter Gutmann wrote:
>
> Martin Rex<mrex@sap.com>  writes:
>
>> The only two situations, where *I* believe that having more than one
>> mandatory to implement hash algorithms for DANE would make sense:
>>
>> 1)  when SHA-1 was permitted (which no one seems to be asking for)
>> 2)  when the SHA-3 winner has been determined (which hasn't happened yet)
>>
>> Personally, I would strongly prefer the hash algorithm list for DANE to be
>>
>>    1)   SHA-256      (FIPS 180-3)    MUST implement
>>    2)   SHA-512      (FIPS 180-3)    SHOULD implement
>
> +1.

FWIW, I have been saying that I support two MUSTs, but I think most of 
the milage of that is gotten by one MUST and one SHOULD.

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