[keyassure] Another comment from the mic

[Eric Rescorla <[e-mail]>]

As I said at the mic, the vast majority of the certificate warnings
you see on the network
are not because of attacks, but rather are due to:

- Self-signed certs
- Certificates from legitimate CAs which are uncompromised but invalid
for some technical
   reason (expired certs, trivial name mismatches, etc.)

One of the purposes of my "permissive" case-2 model in my previous
email is to allow those
self-signed certificate servers to have verifiable credentials.
However, anything we do that
has the consequence that certificates which should verify don't for
mostly-irrelevant technical
reasons (e.g., certs which are validated by DANE but are expired or
have the wrong keyusage
bits) will defeat this purpose to some extent. Perhaps that's worth
doing in service of the correctness
of the validation chain, but it does need to be considered.

-Ekr