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Re: [keyassure] Opening issue #21: "Need to specify which crypto

Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> Fri, 04 March 2011 10:50 UTC

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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu, ynir@checkpoint.com
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Date: Fri, 04 Mar 2011 23:51:10 +1300
Cc: keyassure@ietf.org, hallam@gmail.com, paul.hoffman@vpnc.org
Subject: Re: [keyassure] Opening issue #21: "Need to specify which crypto
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Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com> writes:
>On Mar 4, 2011, at 4:26 AM, Nicholas Weaver wrote:
>> We should not try to scrimp 16B out in message formatting in this case, its
>> silly, redundant, AND encouraging brokenness (bad fragmentation & truncation
>> behavior) to remain borken.
>
>I agree.

Ditto.

>That's weird text. If when SHA-3 arrives, the RFC had been published, we make
>a 3-page "SHA-3 and its use in DANE" draft. If it hasn't, we open an issue and
>add it.

It would be good though to include a placeholder for SHA3 to that, at most,
implementations just have to drop in the implementation code.  I've had a
placeholder in my code for a while now, it's been tested throughout the code
(by using a dummy implementation that returns a constant "hash"), so when SHA3
is finalised all I need to do is plug the algorithm in.  Putting the same
thing into DANE isn't hard, and makes it easier to deploy future-compatible
implementations from day one.

Peter.

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