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Re: [keyassure] Opening issue #21: "Need to specify which crypto

Brian Smith <bsmith@mozilla.com> Tue, 08 March 2011 06:21 UTC

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Date: Mon, 07 Mar 2011 22:23:08 -0800
From: Brian Smith <bsmith@mozilla.com>
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Subject: Re: [keyassure] Opening issue #21: "Need to specify which crypto
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Chris Palmer wrote:
> Actually, I thought that people had roughly agreed to specify SHA-256
> and -384 and to create a slot for SHA-3. If I'm wrong and that's not
> what people have roughly agreed, then I apologize and here are my two
> cents: As long as the minimum is -256 with a plan for SHA-3, I'm
> happy.

It would be better to have both SHA-384 mandatory for clients. Those two algorithms are already practically required because they are both required for a good implementation of TLS 1.2. Making SHA-384 mandatory for clients makes it easier for server administrators to switch from SHA-256 to SHA-384 if that would ever be helpful; that could be a real possibility considering the deployment of SHA-3 on clients is a long way off.

Cheers,
Brian

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