Re: [keyassure] Bare keys again
Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Mon, 21 March 2011 20:48 UTC
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Date: Mon, 21 Mar 2011 13:49:39 -0700
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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
To: Paul Wouters <paul@xelerance.com>
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Cc: keyassure@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [keyassure] Bare keys again
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On Mon, Mar 21, 2011 at 1:39 PM, Paul Wouters <paul@xelerance.com> wrote: > On Mon, 21 Mar 2011, Matt McCutchen wrote: > >>> - "pre_agreed": no CA root key identity supplied. >> >> "pre_agreed" stands for a set of one or more trust anchors that is >> already known to the other side in the context of a particular >> deployment. Hence, bandwidth is saved by not sending identifiers for >> the trust anchors. > > which is the case of the TLS client has gotten the public key from DNS using > DANE. But it does not matter how the client obtained the trust. The client > is telling the server it has all the required trust anchors, and that the > server can ommit sending them over. There's a difference between end-entity certificates and trust anchors, and the RFC 6066 text simply does not say that you can omit the EE cert. > That is exactly what the option is meant > to do. I'm not sure it makes sense to get into questions of textual hermeneutics here, but I don't recall anyone suggesting the omission of the EE cert while this draft was under discussion, so I don't think this assertion is very convincing. > I can see how we would want the TLS client behaviour to be written down in a > standards document, and I am more then happy to do so. In my opinion this is what would be required, and that document would need to be standardized by the TLS WG. > But adding a new > TLS client/server extension is silly. it would have the exact same semantics > as "pre_agreed", as I don't think we would want to state that the "new > pre-agreed" > can only be used if the client has used DANE to validate the key. This is > like > writing separate laws for email spam and fax spam.... That's for the TLS WG to decide. >> Using "pre_agreed" to tell the server it can skip >> sending a certificate chain is not envisioned by RFC 6066. > > On the contrary, that is *exactly* what the goal of 6066 is. It specifies as > reason "memory starved clients" and "reducing bandwidth", but why is that > list treated as an exclusive list? See above. -Ekr
- Re: [keyassure] Issues that no longer issues? Ondřej Surý
- [keyassure] Issues that no longer issues? Warren Kumari
- Re: [keyassure] Issues that no longer issues? Paul Wouters
- [keyassure] Bare keys again Paul Hoffman
- Re: [keyassure] Bare keys again Paul Wouters
- Re: [keyassure] Bare keys again Matt McCutchen
- Re: [keyassure] Bare keys again Paul Hoffman
- Re: [keyassure] Bare keys again Paul Wouters
- Re: [keyassure] Bare keys again Eric Rescorla
- Re: [keyassure] Bare keys again Martin Rex
- Re: [keyassure] Bare keys again Stephen Kent
- Re: [keyassure] Bare keys again Paul Wouters
- Re: [keyassure] Bare keys again Paul Wouters
- Re: [keyassure] Bare keys again Eric Rescorla
- Re: [keyassure] Bare keys again Matt McCutchen
- Re: [keyassure] Bare keys again Matt McCutchen
- Re: [keyassure] Bare keys again Paul Wouters
- Re: [keyassure] Bare keys again Eric Rescorla
- Re: [keyassure] Bare keys again Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [keyassure] Bare keys again Paul Wouters
- Re: [keyassure] Bare keys again Paul Wouters
- Re: [keyassure] Bare keys again Martin Rex
- Re: [keyassure] Bare keys again Matt McCutchen
- Re: [keyassure] Bare keys again Matt McCutchen
- Re: [keyassure] Bare keys again Martin Rex
- Re: [keyassure] Bare keys again Paul Wouters
- Re: [keyassure] Bare keys again Jeff Schmidt
- Re: [keyassure] Bare keys again Paul Hoffman
- Re: [keyassure] Bare keys again Matt McCutchen
- Re: [keyassure] Bare keys again Douglas Otis
- Re: [keyassure] Bare keys again Douglas Otis
- Re: [keyassure] Bare keys again Henry Story
- Re: [keyassure] Bare keys again Paul Wouters
- Re: [keyassure] Bare keys again Ben Laurie
- Re: [keyassure] Bare keys again Paul Hoffman
- Re: [keyassure] Bare keys again Matt McCutchen
- Re: [keyassure] Bare keys again Paul Wouters
- Re: [keyassure] Bare keys again Matt McCutchen