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Re: [keyassure] Objective: Restrictive versus Supplementary Models

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Thu, 31 March 2011 07:48 UTC

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Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2011 09:50:08 +0200
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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
To: Paul Wouters <paul@xelerance.com>
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Subject: Re: [keyassure] Objective: Restrictive versus Supplementary Models
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On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 9:40 AM, Paul Wouters <paul@xelerance.com> wrote:
> On Wed, 30 Mar 2011, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>
>> It's obviously better if DANE is DNSSEC secured, but it's not dangerous
>> if they aren't signed, since that just brings you back to where you were
>> without DANE.
>
> That assumes DANE is an addition to PKIX. Once you assume it is a
> replacement
> for PKIX, you can't have DNSSEC being optional. (If you don't agree, let's
> have coffee at starbucks and use their wifi :)

The context has been lost here, but I was talking about the cert lock
application, not the alternate CA application.

-Ekr

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