Re: [keyassure] Opening issue #21: "Need to specify which crypto

On Mar 2, 2011, at 6:24 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:

> There is currently no evidence that SHA2-256 is unacceptably weak.
>
> However it is based on the same construction as MD4, MD5 and SHA1. And
> thus the reason for the current NIST competition.
>
>
> Since the NIST competition is not currently complete, there is
> currently no viable alternative to SHA2. While there are other
> algorithms in use, I would expect the competition to supersede those
> as well.
>
> I think that what we should do here is
>
> 1) Make support for SHA2-256 and SHA2-384 REQUIRED
> 2) Ensure that it is feasible to transition from use of SHA2 to a  
> new algorithm

<no hats>
Shouldn't this be much much more general? "Ensure that it is feasible  
to transition to new algorithms"? <note: I don't know how we do this,  
but I also don't see why "from SHA2" would be a special case>

> 3) Deprecate use of MD2,MD4,MD5 and SHA1.
>

Um, I'm confused by number 3 -- I think that the only things we need  
to do *here* is decide what we *do* support....
Deprecating the use of other things, while fine and good, doesn't need  
to happen *here* if we don't support them...

W
</no hats>

>
> The second point is really rather important since even though it is
> possible to emit bit strings that use SHA2 in protocols such as SSL
> and S/MIME, it is not feasible to use them in practice because there
> is no way to know whether the other party is one of those which is
> capable of using them.
>
> On Tue, Mar 1, 2011 at 5:38 PM, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>  
> wrote:
>> On 3/1/11 1:37 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
>>>
>>> This particular topic is one on which the Security ADs and the IETF
>>> chair have very very specific opinions on. And given their role in
>>> trying to effect an industry wide transition to stronger  
>>> algorithms, I
>>> think that they are quite right to insist on them.
>>
>> If you can quote previous statements from any of them suggesting that
>> SHA-256 is suspect, that would be more useful than you simply  
>> suggesting
>> that they had said something. It would be useful to this discussion  
>> for each
>> of us to speak only for ourselves and for those who have asked us  
>> to speak
>> for them, or to quote others whom we think are authorities.
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>
>
>
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> Website: http://hallambaker.com/
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--
We know about as much about software quality problems as they knew  
about the Black Plague in the 1600s. We've seen the victims' agonies  
and helped burn the corpses. We don't know what causes it; we don't  
really know if there is only one disease. We just suffer -- and keep  
pouring our sewage into our water supply.

-- Tom Van Vleck