Re: [keyassure] Objective: Restrictive versus Supplementary Models

Paul Wouters <paul@xelerance.com> Wed, 30 March 2011 08:50 UTC

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Date: Wed, 30 Mar 2011 04:51:54 -0400 (EDT)
From: Paul Wouters <paul@xelerance.com>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
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Cc: keyassure@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [keyassure] Objective: Restrictive versus Supplementary Models
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On Wed, 30 Mar 2011, Eric Rescorla wrote:

> To follow up on my comments at the microphone, there are two potential
> objectives for
> technology of this type:
> 
> 1. Protecting against CA mis-issue (as in CA/cert lock).
> 2. Allowing TLS to work without getting a certificate from one of the
> established trust
> anchors.

3. Enhancing privacy by reducing OCSP lookups to CA operators potentially
keeping statistics on these (as proven recently with Comodogate)

Paul