Re: [kitten] Kerberos Preauth Registration for OAuth2 device flow

Luke Howard <lukeh@padl.com> Wed, 10 November 2021 02:11 UTC

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From: Luke Howard <lukeh@padl.com>
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Date: Wed, 10 Nov 2021 13:11:47 +1100
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Cc: "kitten@ietf.org" <kitten@ietf.org>, Pavel Březina <pbrezina@redhat.com>
To: Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: [kitten] Kerberos Preauth Registration for OAuth2 device flow
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[resending from subscribed email, sorry Sam/Pavel]

Hi Sam,

> AS far as I can tell, the reply key is never used (it is replaced) so a
> long-term password is not needed.

Talking my own book here (although, I have no commercial interest) – would the vendor consider defining as a GSS-API mechanism that could be used with draft-perez-krb-wg-gss-preauth? (I suppose, if it needs to work with MIT as opposed to Heimdal, this may be a non-starter as the GSS pre-authentication implementation for MIT is experimental and only supports an earlier version of the draft.)

> 1) It appears to have the same   issues with anonymous pkinit that OTP
> has.
> You probably do not want to use this FAST factor with a armor ticket you
> got from anonymous pkinit.
> If you do, you need to verify the KDC's identity elsewhere.

Right, this is also something that came up with GSS pre-authentication. Of course, if FAST isn’t used then you also have the same problem.

Can they use TLS inside the PA exchange to authenticate the KDC?

Cheers,
Luke