Re: [kitten] [nfsv4] draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpcsec-gssv3: request for review

Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@MIT.EDU> Sun, 03 August 2014 06:08 UTC

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Date: Sun, 03 Aug 2014 02:08:48 -0400
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@MIT.EDU>
To: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
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Cc: "kitten@ietf.org" <kitten@ietf.org>, "Adamson, Andy" <William.Adamson@netapp.com>, NFSv4 <nfsv4@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [kitten] [nfsv4] draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpcsec-gssv3: request for review
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On Fri, 1 Aug 2014, Nico Williams wrote:

>> Three levels of protection are provided for the RPC bodies, none,
>> integrity, and privacy.  The choice of level for this attempt at
>> this RPC, as well as a sequence number unique to this transmission,
>> are encoded into the "credential", a part of the RPC request header;
>> there is a GSS MIC over the header, so the header (and protection
>> level and sequence number) are always protected.  The request
>> payload's encoding depends on the level; for none, it is unchanged.
>> [...]
>
> Though "none" always MICs the header.

Yes.

>> restricted to just a combination of host and user credentials,
>> specifying which one is which.  I think this is the only
>> well-understood scenario for compount authentication at the moment,
>> and makes sense.
>
> What is the antecedent of "this" here?  Did you mean that conveying
> local privilege information is not understood?

"this" is the scenario wherein host credentials and user credentials are 
combined for the compound authentication.  I make no statement on local 
privilege information, rather I claim that scenarios such as combining 
user A's credentials with uesr B's credentials is not well understood.

-Ben