Re: [kitten] [nfsv4] draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpcsec-gssv3: request for review

Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> Mon, 04 August 2014 18:45 UTC

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Date: Mon, 04 Aug 2014 13:45:05 -0500
From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@MIT.EDU>
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Cc: "kitten@ietf.org" <kitten@ietf.org>, "Adamson, Andy" <William.Adamson@netapp.com>, NFSv4 <nfsv4@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [kitten] [nfsv4] draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpcsec-gssv3: request for review
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On Mon, Aug 04, 2014 at 02:13:20PM -0400, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> On Mon, 4 Aug 2014, Nico Williams wrote:
> 
> >On Mon, Aug 04, 2014 at 04:38:16PM +0000, Adamson, Andy wrote:
> >>On Aug 1, 2014, at 6:45 PM, Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> wrote:
> >>>>Why is RPCSEC_GSS_BIND_CHANNEL marked as "not used" in the sample
> >>>>code on page 7?  It is not otherwise mentioned in the draft, and the
> >>>
> >>>Dunno.  It was never marked so in my draft.  Andy?
> >>
> >>It is marked as “not used” in GSSv3 because GSSv3 provides it’s own channel binding method.
> >
> >Ah, right, that's a v2 thing.  Thanks for reminding me!
> 
> Sorry if this is belaboring the point, but my reading of the text in
> -08 is that v3 permits the use of RPCSEC_GSS_BIND_CHANNEL to
> establish a channel over which RPCSEC_GSS_CREATE can be called, and
> implicitly disrecommends the use of this operation for any other
> use.

 - v3 (all versions so far) permits the use of any RPCSEC_GSS context
   handle, whether a v1, v2, or v3 handle.

 - v2 handles may have been channel bound with RPCSEC_GSS_BIND_CHANNEL;
   this is implied and need not be stated, IMO.

RPCSEC_GSS_BIND_CHANNEL should be explicitly forbidden on v3 handles,
as v3 has a different mechanism for channel binding.  It is listed only
for completeness given that v3 is an extension of the earlier versions.

Do you agree?  Or did I miss the point?

Nico
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