Re: [kitten] draft-hansen-scram-sha256 and incorporating session hashing for channel binding

Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org> Sat, 23 May 2015 22:44 UTC

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Date: Sun, 24 May 2015 00:44:38 +0200
From: Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>
To: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
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Subject: Re: [kitten] draft-hansen-scram-sha256 and incorporating session hashing for channel binding
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Den Sat, 23 May 2015 16:43:51 -0500
skrev Re: [kitten] draft-hansen-scram-sha256 and incorporating session
hashing for channel binding:

> On Sat, May 23, 2015 at 10:39:46PM +0200, Simon Josefsson wrote:
> > > There is no need to define a new channel binding.  Existing TLS
> > > implementations need to be fixed regardless.  There's nothing
> > > GSS- or SASL-mechanism-specific here.
> > 
> > There is, since no GS2 mechanism is secure with tls-unique without
> > tls-session-hash.  The fault is not GSS/SASL's, but as far as I
> 
> TLS needs fixing regardless.  tls-unique is perfectly fine when the
> session hash is used.

Perhaps this is a question for the TLS WG -- whether they intend
tls-session-hash to apply as a mandatory fix to all TLS versions or
not.  The document does not say anything about updates now, which means
"TLS needs fixing" won't necessarily happen.

/Simon