Re: [kitten] krb5 gss_pseudo_random implementation/spec variance

Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> Thu, 12 December 2013 00:33 UTC

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Date: Wed, 11 Dec 2013 18:33:17 -0600
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From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
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Cc: "kitten@ietf.org" <kitten@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [kitten] krb5 gss_pseudo_random implementation/spec variance
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I think we should submit an I-D with a) the update to the original, b)
test vectors.  (b) is difficult because we have no standard way to get
a security context with specific keys in it.  We really should
standardize something like the lucid context stuff specifically so
that a) we could publish test vectors for the mechanism, b) re-use
RFC4121 tokens in other non-Kerberos mechanisms.

Nico
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