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Re: [kitten] draft-perez-krb-wg-gss-preauth

Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Mon, 02 August 2021 02:16 UTC

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Date: Sun, 1 Aug 2021 19:16:03 -0700
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Luke Howard <lukeh@padl.com>
Cc: "kitten@ietf.org" <kitten@ietf.org>, Alejandro Perez Mendez <alex@um.es>
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Subject: Re: [kitten] draft-perez-krb-wg-gss-preauth
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On Mon, Aug 02, 2021 at 12:07:18PM +1000, Luke Howard wrote:
> > On Sun, Aug 01, 2021 at 11:37:57PM +1000, Luke Howard wrote:
> >> I’m working on an implementation of draft-perez-krb-wg-gss-preauth-02.txt for Heimdal.
> >> 
> >> Is this something the working group would consider adopting?
> > 
> > It doesn't seem fundamentally like a bad idea, but since we typically
> > recommend that applications should use the GSS-API rather than Kerberos
> > directly, it's not entirely clear to me what situations will require
> > the GSSAPI->Kerberos bridge as opposed to using GSS-API natively.
> 
> Good point. Our use case is supporting existing applications where it’s not feasible to install a new GSS-API mechanism on the acceptor (for reasons of local policy, platform limitations, etc).

Thanks, that makes the motivation a bit more clear.

-Ben

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