Re: [kitten] draft-hansen-scram-sha256 and incorporating session hashing for channel binding

Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org> Wed, 25 February 2015 15:25 UTC

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From: Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>
To: Tony Hansen <tony@att.com>
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Date: Wed, 25 Feb 2015 16:25:08 +0100
In-Reply-To: <54ECABD8.3090902@att.com> (Tony Hansen's message of "Tue, 24 Feb 2015 11:50:32 -0500")
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Subject: Re: [kitten] draft-hansen-scram-sha256 and incorporating session hashing for channel binding
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Tony Hansen <tony@att.com> writes:

> On 2/24/15 6:56 AM, Stephen Farrell wrote:
>> But in addition, there were two substantive issues that ought be
>> resolved before IETF LC:
>>
>> 1. a new channel binding or requiring tls-session-hash (and I guess
>>     some explanatory text about why that is good/needed)
>
> To recap:
>
> Simon Josefsson made this comment:
>
>> Since SCRAM was published, we have learned that the tls-unique channel
>> binding is insecure -- it would be nice if we could combine the SHA256
>> update with another default channel binding type to resolve that
>> problem.  In my view, the problem with SCRAM today isn't primarily its
>> use of SHA1 but it's broken channel binding.
>
> Martin Thompson responded:
>
>> We have a solution for that:
>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-session-hash
>
> I've read through tls-session-hash and am unsure how to proceed here.
>
> One of my goals when proposing SCRAM-SHA-256 was to not change the
> protocol at all, other than updating the hash algorithm.
>
> I'm not sure how to incorporate a recommendation for session hashing
> here. I'm thinking this would be best handled by adding something to
> the Security Considerations section. Does that seem right?
>
> Would anyone be willing to suggest text changes for these comments?

I believe the problem is that RFC 5802 is insecure as currently
specified, and we are bringing this up as a problem with your draft,
which is unfair to you since the problem was not introduced by you.

If people like the tls-session-hash approach (I'm not in that category,
but there may be consensus around it), the proper fix is to update RFC
5802 and reference tls-session-hash as a normative reference.  This will
take care of the problem, as you could copy that text into your
document.  If you are looking for a text change here, it would be:

  To be secure SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS has to be used over a TLS channel that
  MUST have [TLS-SESSION-HASH] negotiated.

Personally, I would prefer to change to another mandatory channel
binding that is secure for all TLS versions.

/Simon