Re: [kitten] The Hashed-Token SASL Mechanism (SASL-HT)
Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com> Tue, 17 October 2017 13:02 UTC
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From: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>, Florian Schmaus <flo@geekplace.eu>
Cc: kitten@ietf.org, Christoph Egger <egger@cs.fau.de>, XMPP Standards <standards@xmpp.org>
Date: Tue, 17 Oct 2017 09:02:17 -0400
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References: <9913d71b-ae22-cc48-34b8-fb29fdf9a00c@geekplace.eu> <20171016025117.GL96685@kduck.kaduk.org>
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Subject: Re: [kitten] The Hashed-Token SASL Mechanism (SASL-HT)
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On Sun, 2017-10-15 at 21:51 -0500, Benjamin Kaduk wrote: > On Fri, Sep 29, 2017 at 11:08:10AM +0200, Florian Schmaus wrote: > > I would like to note the existence of draft-schmaus-kitten-sasl-ht- > > 01: > > > > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-schmaus-kitten-sasl-ht-01 > > Thanks, I just got a chance to look it over. > > [...] > > > Thus we initially authenticate an XMPP session using a strong > > mechanism > > like SCRAM, but at resumption-time we want a single round trip > > mechanism. The basic idea of such a mechanism is that the client > > requests a short-lived, exclusively ephemeral token after being > > authenticated, which can be used to authenticate the resumption in > > an > > efficient manner. > > [...] > > The SASL HT-* mechanism outlined is attempting to provide a > > reasonably > > secure authentication based around a token obtained over the > > application > > protocol, in a single round-trip. This single-round-trip is a key > > requirement. The proposal uses a single-use token as a shared > > secret, > > provides channel binding and mutual authentication. > > There does seem to be some value in having a fast "session > resumption" SASL mechanism to avoid repeated reauthentication (though > presumably there should be some guidance to periodically require a > full authentication; various flows elsewhere do this on a month > timescale, roughly). > It's a little unfortunate that this ends up requiring TLS for > confidentiality (as there is some desire to have standalone > mechanisms), but that seems to be an acceptable tradeoff for this > sort of application. I think this draft has many goals in common with this one: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-wibrown-ldapssotoken-02 I wonder if we can end up having a solution that will work well to cover it all ? The main issue here would be the requirement to bind it to TLS as LDAP (as well as other connection-oriented protocols) can use other means to encrypt the channel (namely GSSAPI, although GSSAPI doe not have a session resumption mechanism ...). Simo. -- Simo Sorce Sr. Principal Software Engineer Red Hat, Inc
- [kitten] The Hashed-Token SASL Mechanism (SASL-HT) Florian Schmaus
- Re: [kitten] The Hashed-Token SASL Mechanism (SAS… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [kitten] The Hashed-Token SASL Mechanism (SAS… Sam Whited
- Re: [kitten] The Hashed-Token SASL Mechanism (SAS… Florian Schmaus
- Re: [kitten] The Hashed-Token SASL Mechanism (SAS… Simo Sorce
- Re: [kitten] The Hashed-Token SASL Mechanism (SAS… Sam Whited
- Re: [kitten] The Hashed-Token SASL Mechanism (SAS… Florian Schmaus
- Re: [kitten] The Hashed-Token SASL Mechanism (SAS… Florian Schmaus
- Re: [kitten] The Hashed-Token SASL Mechanism (SAS… Sam Whited
- Re: [kitten] The Hashed-Token SASL Mechanism (SAS… Alexey Melnikov
- Re: [kitten] The Hashed-Token SASL Mechanism (SAS… Sam Whited
- Re: [kitten] The Hashed-Token SASL Mechanism (SAS… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [kitten] The Hashed-Token SASL Mechanism (SAS… Florian Schmaus
- Re: [kitten] The Hashed-Token SASL Mechanism (SAS… Alexey Melnikov
- Re: [kitten] The Hashed-Token SASL Mechanism (SAS… Florian Schmaus
- Re: [kitten] The Hashed-Token SASL Mechanism (SAS… Florian Schmaus