Re: [kitten] Verified authorization data
Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com> Wed, 11 June 2014 17:08 UTC
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From: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
To: Peter Mogensen <apm@one.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2014 13:08:10 -0400
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Subject: Re: [kitten] Verified authorization data
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On Wed, 2014-06-11 at 19:02 +0200, Peter Mogensen wrote: > On 2014-06-11 18:17, Simo Sorce wrote: > > On Wed, 2014-06-11 at 14:20 +0200, Peter Mogensen wrote: > >> The solution in AD-CAMMAC seems very complex too, requiring > >> effectively calculating the entire EncTicketPart twice - and once for > >> every present AD-CAMMAC present. > > > > I am confused about this statement. The AD-CAMMAC draft specifies that > > it contains a sequence of AD elements, that means you have only 1 > > AD-CAMMAC for all the AD data you want to protect. You check the whole > > thing only once. > > > I were not sure whether you could rule out any use case requiring > merging of 2 AD-CAMMAC elements with - say - different other-verifier > checksums for which the KDC didn't have all the keys. > But I guess that since other-verifier restricts the principals to be in > the KDC realm, that could not happen. > > Still... the whole EncTicketPart has to be constructed and DER-encoded > twice to add a kdc-verifier. That is done to bind the CAMMAC to a specific ticket, it is an additional protection that you probably want for your use case too. Simo. -- Simo Sorce * Red Hat, Inc * New York
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- Re: [kitten] Token Preauth for Kerberos Zheng, Kai
- Re: [kitten] Token Preauth for Kerberos Zheng, Kai
- [kitten] Verified authorization data Peter Mogensen
- Re: [kitten] Token Preauth for Kerberos Zheng, Kai
- Re: [kitten] Token Preauth for Kerberos Zheng, Kai
- Re: [kitten] Verified authorization data Simo Sorce
- Re: [kitten] Verified authorization data Peter Mogensen
- Re: [kitten] Verified authorization data Simo Sorce
- Re: [kitten] Token Preauth for Kerberos Nathaniel McCallum
- Re: [kitten] Verified authorization data Peter Mogensen
- Re: [kitten] Verified authorization data Simo Sorce
- Re: [kitten] Verified authorization data Peter Mogensen
- Re: [kitten] Verified authorization data Simo Sorce
- Re: [kitten] Verified authorization data Peter Mogensen
- Re: [kitten] Verified authorization data Simo Sorce
- Re: [kitten] Verified authorization data Peter Mogensen
- Re: [kitten] Verified authorization data Simo Sorce
- Re: [kitten] Token Preauth for Kerberos Simo Sorce
- Re: [kitten] Token Preauth for Kerberos Zheng, Kai
- Re: [kitten] Token Preauth for Kerberos Zheng, Kai
- Re: [kitten] Token Preauth for Kerberos Wang Weijun
- Re: [kitten] Token Preauth for Kerberos Zheng, Kai
- Re: [kitten] Token Preauth for Kerberos Zheng, Kai
- Re: [kitten] Token Preauth for Kerberos Simo Sorce
- Re: [kitten] Token Preauth for Kerberos Dr. Greg Wettstein
- Re: [kitten] Token Preauth for Kerberos Zheng, Kai
- Re: [kitten] Token Preauth for Kerberos Zheng, Kai
- Re: [kitten] Token Preauth for Kerberos Simo Sorce
- Re: [kitten] Token Preauth for Kerberos Zheng, Kai
- Re: [kitten] Token Preauth for Kerberos Greg Hudson
- Re: [kitten] Token Preauth for Kerberos Zheng, Kai
- Re: [kitten] Token Preauth for Kerberos Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [kitten] Token Preauth for Kerberos Zheng, Kai