Re: [kitten] considering abandoning CTS mode (Re: I-D Action:draft-ietf-kitten-aes-cts-hmac-sha2-01.txt)

I was unclear.  It affected AES-192, just much less.

On Aug 16, 2013, at 5:31 PM, "Henry B. Hotz" <hotz@jpl.nasa.gov> wrote:

> 
> On Aug 14, 2013, at 8:26 PM, Tom Yu <tlyu@MIT.EDU> wrote:
> 
>>> Also why SHA 384 instead of 512?
>> 
>> I asked Kelley about this, and he said the Suite B mandate was for 128
>> bits for lower security, and 192 bits for higher security.  That would
>> imply SHA-384 (I think HMAC-SHA-256 should be sufficient, but they
>> want an unequivocal 192 bits of strength).  I don't know why Suite B
>> doesn't specify AES-192 instead of AES-256 though.  Maybe these
>> rationales should be included in future revisions.
> 
> There was some post on saag about AES-256 now being only 119-bits effective strength?  I confess I never backtracked the source material.  The problem didn't affect AES-128 and AES-192 much less.
> 
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> Henry.B.Hotz@jpl.nasa.gov, or hbhotz@oxy.edu
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------------------------------------------------------
The opinions expressed in this message are mine,
not those of Caltech, JPL, NASA, or the US Government.
Henry.B.Hotz@jpl.nasa.gov, or hbhotz@oxy.edu