Re: [kitten] Merging ideas: Renegotiate, TLS-PSK, Key Derivation
Alexey Melnikov <alexey.melnikov@isode.com> Wed, 18 January 2023 11:47 UTC
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From: Alexey Melnikov <alexey.melnikov@isode.com>
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Subject: Re: [kitten] Merging ideas: Renegotiate, TLS-PSK, Key Derivation
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Hi Rick, On 18/01/2023 09:42, Rick van Rein wrote: > Hi, > > The ideas presented yesterday sort-of melted together in my mind. > > The idea of renegotiation came up, and I wonder if that is specific > to one SASL mechanism, or could be a general mechanism that can be > offered for the second round. I am thinking that renegotiation should work with most "modern" SASL mechanisms. > Likewise, TLS-PSK expects integration with TLS from the application, > but that is not necessarily impossible; the classical Security Layer > also integrated into the application. The SASL layer may facilitate > by stating that a TLS-PSK key injection will be done (perhaps by > flagging it as a mechanism that should never be selected). > > Both would benefit from the gut feeling I presented, that is key > derivation based on SASL secret/entropy, which might be defined > for OPAQUE and is in Section 2.7 of SXOVER-PLUS. We should think > carefully if key derivation may be retrofitted on other mechs when > these facilities/mechs are offered. I think adding it to SCRAM would be a good idea. I consider CRAM-MD5 and DIGEST-MD5 to be legacy SASL mechanisms, so I wouldn't bother extending them. > I suppose the one thing to be careful about would be the timeout > for the facilation of renegotiation; perhaps mechnames should > somewhat like > > TLS-PSK-300 REPEAT-300 > TLS-PSK-3600 REPEAT-3600 > TLS-PSK-86400 REPEAT-86400 > > to indicate the maximum client dependency time and the minimum > server acceptance time. > > Would this make sense? I have a mixed feeling about time limits being advertised in mechanism names. I think I would prefer to have a single (or maybe 2) SASL mechanisms and advertise the expiration limit inside the mechanism exchange. Best Regards, Alexey
- Re: [kitten] Merging ideas: Renegotiate, TLS-PSK,… Alexey Melnikov
- [kitten] Merging ideas: Renegotiate, TLS-PSK, Key… Rick van Rein
- Re: [kitten] Merging ideas: Renegotiate, TLS-PSK,… Nico Williams
- Re: [kitten] Merging ideas: Renegotiate, TLS-PSK,… Alexey Melnikov