Re: [kitten] GSS-only enctypes

Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@MIT.EDU> Wed, 01 April 2015 20:05 UTC

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Date: Wed, 01 Apr 2015 16:04:58 -0400
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@MIT.EDU>
To: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
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Cc: "kitten@ietf.org" <kitten@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [kitten] GSS-only enctypes
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On Tue, 31 Mar 2015, Nico Williams wrote:

> I think the consensus at the meeting was that we could indeed reuse
> the Kerberos enctype number space for GSS-only enctypes, since there
> is some precedent for this.  It would be significantly easier, from an
> implementation perspective, to do just that.

I'm not sure that we got enough active input at the meeting on this
question to be able to declare consensus.  Regardless, we should ask the
list if there are objections to (or support for) using the Kerberos
enctype number space for enctypes with restricted usability (i.e., only
for subsession keys, or GSS, etc.).

-Ben