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Re: [Lake] Forward Security with PSK-Only LAKE

Benjamin Beurdouche <benjamin.beurdouche@inria.fr> Sat, 18 January 2020 11:27 UTC

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From: Benjamin Beurdouche <benjamin.beurdouche@inria.fr>
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Date: Sat, 18 Jan 2020 12:26:58 +0100
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Subject: Re: [Lake] Forward Security with PSK-Only LAKE
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> So, if you tell me that LAKE will provide a mechanism <insert name> (e.g.FS) that enables us to recover secrecy from a
> passive compromise while most of the time using the PSK rotation for FS, I am willing to say it is ok.
> Otherwise, if there is no hope to introduce freshness via <insert mechanism> (e.g.FS) and that a compromised session will always
> remain compromised, I’ll maintain that we cannot claim this to be a secure AKE for protocols we’ll build on top…


(e.g. FS) -> (e.g. DH) obviously...

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