[Lake] LAKE next steps
Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Tue, 20 August 2019 15:50 UTC
Return-Path: <kaduk@mit.edu>
X-Original-To: lake@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: lake@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id EAF7D120985; Tue, 20 Aug 2019 08:50:15 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -4.2
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.2 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id w5S5a0Hketqn; Tue, 20 Aug 2019 08:50:12 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from outgoing.mit.edu (outgoing-auth-1.mit.edu [18.9.28.11]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 793D3120986; Tue, 20 Aug 2019 08:50:12 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from kduck.mit.edu ([24.16.140.251]) (authenticated bits=56) (User authenticated as kaduk@ATHENA.MIT.EDU) by outgoing.mit.edu (8.14.7/8.12.4) with ESMTP id x7KFo7OC006446 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Tue, 20 Aug 2019 11:50:10 -0400
Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2019 10:50:07 -0500
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: lake@ietf.org
Cc: secdispatch@ietf.org
Message-ID: <20190820155006.GE60855@kduck.mit.edu>
Reply-To: lake@ietf.org
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
Content-Disposition: inline
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
User-Agent: Mutt/1.10.1 (2018-07-13)
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/lake/kACwW7PXrmTRa4PvXQ0TA34xCvk>
Subject: [Lake] LAKE next steps
X-BeenThere: lake@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: Lightweight Authenticated Key Exchange <lake.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/lake>, <mailto:lake-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/lake/>
List-Post: <mailto:lake@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:lake-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/lake>, <mailto:lake-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2019 15:50:16 -0000
Thank you to everyone who attended the LAKE BoF session! It was a productive meeting that highlighted the community’s needs for work in this space. A key insight that emerged during the session was that there is a fairly clear split between the “AKE for OSCORE” case and “general purpose lightweight AKE” in terms of the set of requirements. We are happy to note a strong level of interest in a TLS-based solution that removes unnecessary protocol fields and encoding redundancy, which has significant potential for use in protocols that do not require traditional TLS cross-version compatibility, in constrained and full-featured environments alike. Likewise, we saw that the additional community engagement of a BoF was able to provide new insights into the use cases and requirements for a LAKE [0], both in the OSCORE and the more general case -- this is a great indication of the value provided by the broad and cross-area IETF review process. Based on the input received and energy in the room, we feel that it’s appropriate to charter a WG to finish coalescing the requirements for the OSCORE use case and evaluate solutions. From we’ve seen so far, EDHOC seems like the leading contender, especially with respect to the “reuse of COSE algorithms” proposed requirement, but we of course welcome further data (such as on the relative code footprint of core cryptographic primitives vs. protocol integration for COSE/cTLS/etc.). We also feel that it’s appropriate to find a home for work on cTLS to come to fruition. As noted during the BoF, this presents a multifaceted problem, with input needed from TLS experts as to which parts of the protocol are legacy artifacts vs. cryptographically necessary, and also with input needed from domain experts on constrained devices as to which protocol features are necessary and where to fall on the spectrum of tradeoffs between fully general/full-featured and a stripped-down, bare-bones feature set. On the balance, though, it seems that discussion of a general-purpose-but-compact TLS would be most effectively done in the TLS WG with additional input and collaboration as needed. We plan to ask the TLS WG if there is interest in rechartering to take on this “constrained TLS” work item (and we note that this includes thinking about whether it is best done as a standalone specification or a “patch” or “filter” to stock TLS that could apply to multiple TLS versions). For the sake of facilitating discussion, we include draft charter text for the OSCORE case, modified based on input from the BoF from the version that was previously sent to secdispatch@ietf: ==[ CHARTER ]== Problem Constrained environments using OSCORE in network environments such as NB-IoT, 6TiSCH, and LoRaWAN need a ‘lightweight’ authenticated key exchange (LAKE) that enables forward security. 'Lightweight' refers to: * resource consumption, measured by bytes on the wire, wall-clock time to complete, or power consumption * the amount of new code required on end systems which already have an OSCORE stack Goals This working group is intended to be a narrowly focused activity intended to produce at most one LAKE for OSCORE usage and close. The working group will collaborate and coordinate with other IETF WGs such as ACE, CORE, 6TISCH, and LPWAN to understand and validate the requirements and solution. The WG will also evaluate work from the TLS WG and derivatives thereof, and draft-selander-ace-cose-ecdhe. Program of Work The deliverables of this WG are: 1. Design requirements of the lightweight authenticated key exchange protocol for OSCORE (this draft will not be published as an RFC but will be used to drive WG consensus on the deliverable (2) 2. Specify a lightweight authenticated key exchange protocol suitable for use in constrained environments using OSCORE ==[ CHARTER ]== Thanks, Ben and Roman [0] For example, the total number of key exchange operations expected to be performed over the lifetime of the device, as might be compared against the total lifetime energy budget; and a request to make explicit what had previously been implicit assumptions about the cost of various operations (on various axes).
- [Lake] LAKE chartering discussion Michael Richardson
- [Lake] LAKE next steps Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [Lake] LAKE next steps Rene Struik
- Re: [Lake] LAKE next steps Martin Thomson
- Re: [Lake] LAKE chartering discussion Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [Lake] LAKE next steps Göran Selander
- Re: [Lake] LAKE next steps Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [Lake] LAKE next steps Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [Lake] [Secdispatch] LAKE next steps Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [Lake] [Secdispatch] LAKE next steps Eric Rescorla
- Re: [Lake] LAKE next steps Rene Struik
- Re: [Lake] [Secdispatch] LAKE next steps Göran Selander
- Re: [Lake] LAKE next steps Yoav Nir
- Re: [Lake] [Secdispatch] LAKE next steps Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [Lake] LAKE next steps Rene Struik
- Re: [Lake] [Secdispatch] LAKE next steps Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [Lake] LAKE next steps Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [Lake] [Secdispatch] LAKE next steps Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [Lake] [Secdispatch] LAKE next steps Göran Selander
- Re: [Lake] [Secdispatch] LAKE next steps Michael Richardson