Re: [Lake] Ways forward on MTI cipher suite text
Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> Thu, 20 January 2022 20:36 UTC
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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Date: Thu, 20 Jan 2022 15:36:13 -0500
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To: Mališa Vučinić <malisa.vucinic@inria.fr>
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Subject: Re: [Lake] Ways forward on MTI cipher suite text
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Selecting one MTI provides the broadest possible interoperability. I think it would be harmful at this stage to divide the implementers into 0/1 and 2/3. Russ > On Jan 20, 2022, at 3:33 PM, Mališa Vučinić <malisa.vucinic@inria.fr> wrote: > > Russ, > > Thanks for your feedback. Could you state any technical arguments why do you believe that would be the best way forward? > > Mališa > >> On 20 Jan 2022, at 21:22, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> wrote: >> >> I would prefer to see one MTI (Option 2). I can live with that MIT being 0/1 or 2/3, and I have a mild preference for 2/3. >> >> Russ >> >> >>> On Jan 20, 2022, at 12:03 PM, Mališa Vučinić <malisa.vucinic@inria.fr> wrote: >>> >>> Dear all, >>> >>> During the last LAKE interim meeting, we discussed the issue >>> of an MTI cipher suite and we agreed for the chairs to open a >>> thread on the subject. As a reminder, the previous discussion >>> points on this topic are summarized in github [1] and in >>> John’s mail dated 13 May 2021 [2]. >>> >>> We’d like to see if there is rough consensus in the WG on >>> this topic, at this moment in time. Knowing that the formal >>> analysis of the EDHOC-12 specification is under way, we >>> should keep in mind that additional input may arrive down the >>> road from teams working in the computational model. >>> >>> As a reminder, the most recently discussed text for this >>> is in a PR [3] and states: >>> >>> “For many constrained IoT devices it is problematic to support several crypto primitives. Existing devices can be expected to support either ECDSA or EdDSA. Cipher suites 0 (AES-CCM-16-64-128, SHA-256, 8, X25519, EdDSA, AES-CCM-16-64-128, SHA-256) and 1 (AES-CCM-16-128-128, SHA-256, 16, X25519, EdDSA, AES-CCM-16-64-128, SHA-256) only differ in size of the MAC length, so supporting one or both of these is no essential difference. Similarly for cipher suites 2 (AES-CCM-16-64-128, SHA-256, 8, P-256, ES256, AES-CCM-16-64-128, SHA-256) and 3 (AES-CCM-16-128-128, SHA-256, 16, P-256, ES256, AES-CCM-16-64-128, SHA-256). To enable as much interoperability as possible, less constrained devices SHOULD implement all four cipher suites 0-3. Constrained endpoints SHOULD implement cipher suites 0 and 1, or cipher suites 2 and 3. Implementations only need to implement the algorithms needed for their supported methods.” >>> >>> The options we see at this moment in time are: >>> >>> Option 1: Keep current text as-is unless/until more feedback >>> is provided that motivates re-opening this issue >>> Option 2: Proceed with selecting a single MTI cipher suite >>> >>> We'd like to know if the WG can live with Option 1. Note that >>> doesn't mean you think option 1 is perfect, just that it's >>> something with which you can live. If you prefer option 2 or >>> some other option please suggest specific text. >>> >>> Mališa and Stephen >>> >>> [1] https://github.com/lake-wg/edhoc/issues/22 >>> [2] https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/lake/75nRaD6czYG6RqLT06Qe8C_lsaM/ >>> [3] https://github.com/lake-wg/edhoc/pull/225/files >> >
- [Lake] Ways forward on MTI cipher suite text Mališa Vučinić
- Re: [Lake] Ways forward on MTI cipher suite text Russ Housley
- Re: [Lake] Ways forward on MTI cipher suite text Mališa Vučinić
- Re: [Lake] Ways forward on MTI cipher suite text Russ Housley
- Re: [Lake] Ways forward on MTI cipher suite text Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
- Re: [Lake] Ways forward on MTI cipher suite text Peter.Blomqvist
- Re: [Lake] Ways forward on MTI cipher suite text Marco Tiloca
- Re: [Lake] Ways forward on MTI cipher suite text Göran Selander
- Re: [Lake] Ways forward on MTI cipher suite text John Mattsson
- Re: [Lake] Ways forward on MTI cipher suite text Peter.Blomqvist
- Re: [Lake] Ways forward on MTI cipher suite text Michael Richardson
- Re: [Lake] Ways forward on MTI cipher suite text Göran Selander
- Re: [Lake] Ways forward on MTI cipher suite text Michael Richardson
- Re: [Lake] Ways forward on MTI cipher suite text Stephen Farrell
- Re: [Lake] Ways forward on MTI cipher suite text Carsten Bormann
- Re: [Lake] Ways forward on MTI cipher suite text Stephen Farrell
- Re: [Lake] Ways forward on MTI cipher suite text Ira McDonald
- Re: [Lake] Ways forward on MTI cipher suite text John Mattsson
- Re: [Lake] Ways forward on MTI cipher suite text Göran Selander
- Re: [Lake] Ways forward on MTI cipher suite text Claeys, Timothy
- Re: [Lake] Ways forward on MTI cipher suite text Michael Richardson
- Re: [Lake] Ways forward on MTI cipher suite text Michael Richardson
- Re: [Lake] Ways forward on MTI cipher suite text Michael Richardson
- Re: [Lake] Ways forward on MTI cipher suite text John Mattsson
- Re: [Lake] Ways forward on MTI cipher suite text John Mattsson
- Re: [Lake] Ways forward on MTI cipher suite text Peter.Blomqvist
- Re: [Lake] Ways forward on MTI cipher suite text Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
- Re: [Lake] Ways forward on MTI cipher suite text Michael Richardson
- Re: [Lake] Ways forward on MTI cipher suite text Carsten Bormann
- Re: [Lake] Ways forward on MTI cipher suite text John Mattsson
- Re: [Lake] Ways forward on MTI cipher suite text Michael Richardson
- Re: [Lake] Ways forward on MTI cipher suite text Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
- Re: [Lake] Ways forward on MTI cipher suite text Peter.Blomqvist
- Re: [Lake] Ways forward on MTI cipher suite text John Mattsson
- Re: [Lake] Ways forward on MTI cipher suite text Göran Selander
- Re: [Lake] Ways forward on MTI cipher suite text Stephen Farrell
- Re: [Lake] Ways forward on MTI cipher suite text Mališa Vučinić
- Re: [Lake] Ways forward on MTI cipher suite text Rene Struik