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From: Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 5 Jan 2026 13:10:58 -0800
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Hi,

This message is a last-call comment regarding draft-ietf-emailcore-as-26.

This document is normatively referenced[0] from
draft-ietf-emailcore-rfc5321bis. The transport security requirements are
weak and full of caveats:

"Therefore, confidentiality (for example, the STARTTLS extension) MUST be
implemented by SMTP servers in order to at least provide over-the-wire
confidentiality during an individual SMTP exchange.  That said, there are
many legacy implementations of SMTP that are still in widespread use in
both private and Internet-connected networks and receiving server
implementations will often be expected to be capable of receiving such
messages.  Therefore, SMTP servers MUST be configurable to allow for
receiving messages without confidentiality between servers in order to
maximize interoperation."

The document could say:

"Transport-level confidentiality (e.g. the STARTTLS extension) MUST be
implemented by SMTP servers. To accommodate older implementations, SMTP
servers MUST be configurable to allow for receiving messages without
confidentiality between servers."

What the document should say is that TLS is required, and that older
implementations might follow RFC 5321. There's no need to designate older
implementations as conformant for all time. Deb Cooley's comment on
draft-ietf-emailcore-rfc5321bis describes this point in a different way
[1]. I think someone in the WG said "requiring TLS is unrealistic, and
could damage the credibility of the IETF". I think allowing SMTP in the
clear damages the credibility of the IETF, even though TLS everywhere is
aspirational.

In this document, we have the bare minimum from 2002 [2]. The document also
fails to cite BCP 188 [2]. That reference should appear when
draft-ietf-emailcore-as-26 mentions you can disable transport layer
security.

The WG also has an issue tracker, but doesn't seem to use it all of the
time. That might be worse than not having one at all.

https://github.com/ietf-wg-emailcore/emailcore/issues

There are many issues about HTML forms, but the HTML reference was removed
without an issue being filed.

https://github.com/ietf-wg-emailcore/emailcore/issues/51

So, this all took a long time. That's what happens if you don't use issue
trackers, git, and asynchronous interaction. 30 minutes on the mic every 4
months is a bad way to work.

Further, dragging one's feet on IETF consensus security properties and
/then/ complaining about the timeline is odd.

thanks,
Rob

[0] "I see that this now includes a normative reference to the AS. While
this is not my ideal outcome, I consider it acceptable, provided, of
course, that the final version of the AS adequately addresses transport
security."

https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/last-call/O91WtuzsApyeVCCuhTlnnr1THhU/

[1] "It is shocking to me that this draft is being considered with
literally no mandatory security mechanisms."

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-emailcore-rfc5321bis/history/

[2] MUST is for Implementors
https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3365.html#section-7

[3] Pervasive Monitoring Is an Attack
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc7258/

--00000000000083cd500647aa7fd3
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">Hi,<br><br>This message is a last-call comment regarding d=
raft-ietf-emailcore-as-26.<br><br>This document is normatively referenced[0=
] from draft-ietf-emailcore-rfc5321bis. The transport security requirements=
 are weak and full of caveats:<br><br>&quot;Therefore, confidentiality (for=
 example, the STARTTLS extension) MUST be implemented by SMTP servers in or=
der to at least provide over-the-wire confidentiality during an individual =
SMTP exchange.=C2=A0 That said, there are many legacy implementations of SM=
TP that are still in widespread use in both private and Internet-connected =
networks and receiving server implementations will often be expected to be =
capable of receiving such messages.=C2=A0 Therefore, SMTP servers MUST be c=
onfigurable to allow for receiving messages without confidentiality between=
 servers in order to maximize interoperation.&quot;<br><br>The document cou=
ld say:<br><br>&quot;Transport-level confidentiality (e.g. the STARTTLS ext=
ension) MUST be implemented by SMTP servers. To accommodate older implement=
ations, SMTP servers MUST be configurable to allow for receiving messages w=
ithout confidentiality between servers.&quot;<br><br>What the document shou=
ld say is that TLS is required, and that older implementations might follow=
 RFC 5321. There&#39;s no need to designate older implementations as confor=
mant for all time. Deb Cooley&#39;s comment on draft-ietf-emailcore-rfc5321=
bis describes this point in a different way [1]. I think someone in the WG =
said &quot;requiring TLS is unrealistic, and could damage the credibility o=
f the IETF&quot;. I think allowing SMTP in the clear damages the credibilit=
y of the IETF, even though TLS everywhere is aspirational.<br><br>In this d=
ocument, we have the bare minimum from 2002 [2]. The document also fails to=
 cite BCP 188 [2]. That reference should appear when draft-ietf-emailcore-a=
s-26 mentions you can disable transport layer security.<br><br>The WG also =
has an issue tracker, but doesn&#39;t seem to use it all of the time. That =
might be worse than not having one at all.<br><br><a href=3D"https://github=
.com/ietf-wg-emailcore/emailcore/issues">https://github.com/ietf-wg-emailco=
re/emailcore/issues</a><br><br>There are many issues about HTML forms, but =
the HTML reference was removed without an issue being filed.<br><br><a href=
=3D"https://github.com/ietf-wg-emailcore/emailcore/issues/51">https://githu=
b.com/ietf-wg-emailcore/emailcore/issues/51</a><br><br>So, this all took a =
long time. That&#39;s what happens if you don&#39;t use issue trackers, git=
, and asynchronous interaction. 30 minutes on the mic every 4 months is a b=
ad way to work.<br><br>Further, dragging one&#39;s feet on IETF consensus s=
ecurity properties and /then/ complaining about the timeline is odd.<br><br=
>thanks,<br>Rob<br><br>[0] &quot;I see that this now includes a normative r=
eference to the AS. While this is not my ideal outcome, I consider it accep=
table, provided, of course, that the final version of the AS adequately add=
resses transport security.&quot;<br><br><a href=3D"https://mailarchive.ietf=
.org/arch/msg/last-call/O91WtuzsApyeVCCuhTlnnr1THhU/">https://mailarchive.i=
etf.org/arch/msg/last-call/O91WtuzsApyeVCCuhTlnnr1THhU/</a><br><br>[1] &quo=
t;It is shocking to me that this draft is being considered with literally n=
o mandatory security mechanisms.&quot;<br><br><a href=3D"https://datatracke=
r.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-emailcore-rfc5321bis/history/">https://datatracke=
r.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-emailcore-rfc5321bis/history/</a><br><br>[2] MUST=
 is for Implementors<br><a href=3D"https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3365.h=
tml#section-7">https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3365.html#section-7</a><br=
><br>[3] Pervasive Monitoring Is an Attack<br><a href=3D"https://datatracke=
r.ietf.org/doc/rfc7258/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc7258/</a><br><=
/div>

--00000000000083cd500647aa7fd3--

