Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts
Mark R Bannister <dbis@proseconsulting.co.uk> Fri, 10 January 2014 14:37 UTC
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Date: Fri, 10 Jan 2014 14:36:45 +0000
From: Mark R Bannister <dbis@proseconsulting.co.uk>
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To: Luke Howard <lukeh@padl.com>
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Cc: Ldapext <ldapext@ietf.org>, Andrew Findlay <andrew.findlay@skills-1st.co.uk>, Mich ael Ströder <michael@stroeder.com>
Subject: Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts
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On 10/01/2014 14:15, Luke Howard wrote: >>> Every LDAP-aware client system that I have worked with can use the >>> bind operation as a means to validate passwords, so the only >>> possible excuse for exporting hashes is temporary support of >>> migrating systems. If you only allow the export of hashes that are >>> actually needed by the old non-LDAP systems then at least you are >>> not making matters worse than they were before the migration. >> Ok, so I posed this question just now, but can all LDAP servers you can think of authentication bind operations using CRYPT-style passwords? If it can be done server-side there'll be no problem here and we need never expose the hashes to clients. > Active Directory cannot. > > -- Luke Thanks Luke. Everywhere I have seen UNIX accounts deployed on AD, Kerberos password authentication has been used, so in those places it would not be an issue. However, I cannot possibly know how many people out there rely on CRYPT hashes in AD attributes, and I'm not about to cut off the possibly of them migrating to DBIS. CRYPT will therefore have to remain as an option, although I'm perfectly happy to put stronger wording around it. So far I have written: While a DUA MAY implement any authentication password scheme supported by the DSA, it MUST support the CRYPT scheme for backwards compatibility, which is an implementation of the traditional UNIX crypt algorithm. However, it is RECOMMENDED that a more secure scheme is used. and ... Passwd and group database entries contain encrypted passwords and SHOULD be transmitted securely when transferred between DSA and DUA to prevent eavesdropping. A DUA SHOULD NOT allow a user to see any encrypted passwords except they MAY see the password on their own posixUserAccount entry in encrypted form. Open to suggestions on how to reword this. Best regards, Mark.
- [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Mark R Bannister
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Howard Chu
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Mark R Bannister
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Howard Chu
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Mark R Bannister
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Mark R Bannister
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Howard Chu
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Howard Chu
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Arthur de Jong
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Michael Ströder
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Michael Ströder
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Mark R Bannister
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Mark R Bannister
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Mark R Bannister
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Mark R Bannister
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Mark R Bannister
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Michael Ströder
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Michael Ströder
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Michael Ströder
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Michael Ströder
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Ludovic Poitou
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Clément OUDOT
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Andrew Findlay
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Andrew Findlay
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Michael Ströder
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Michael Ströder
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Michael Ströder
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Michael Ströder
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Charlie
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Luke Howard
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Neal-Joslin, Robert (3PAR Engineering)
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Howard Chu
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Michael Ströder
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Mark R Bannister
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Mark R Bannister
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Mark R Bannister
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Mark R Bannister
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Mark R Bannister
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Luke Howard
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Luke Howard
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Mark R Bannister
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Mark R Bannister
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Mark R Bannister
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Mark R Bannister
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Michael Ströder
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Mark R Bannister
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Michael Ströder
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Michael Ströder
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Andrew Findlay
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Andrew Findlay
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Michael Ströder
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Michael Ströder
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Howard Chu
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Charlie
- Re: [ldapext] DBIS - new IETF drafts Mark R Bannister