Re: [lisp] Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-ietf-lisp-sec-27: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

[Luigi Iannone <[e-mail]>]

Hi Roman,

Thank you very much for your review.

A few proposed changes  inline.

> On 29 Jun 2022, at 03:47, Roman Danyliw via Datatracker <[e-mail]> wrote:
> 
> Roman Danyliw has entered the following ballot position for
> draft-ietf-lisp-sec-27: Discuss
> 
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> 
> 
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> DISCUSS:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> ** Since originally scheduled for the telechat in version -26, thank you for
> adding the following text about preferring HMAC-SHA256 for new deployments in
> -27:
> 
>   The HMAC
>   function AUTH-HMAC-SHA-256-128 [RFC6234] MUST be supported in LISP-
>   SEC implementations.  LISP-SEC deployments SHOULD use AUTH-HMAC-SHA-
>   256-128 HMAC function, unless older implementations using AUTH-HMAC-
>   SHA-1-96 are present in the same deployment [RFC2104].
> 
> Could this same approach be applied for the algorithms set by KDF ID. 
> Specifically:
> 
> -- Section 6.9 says:
> 
>   The key derivation function
>   HKDF-SHA1-128 [RFC5869] MUST be supported.
> ...
>  However, since HKDF-SHA1-128 is mandatory to implement, the process
>   will eventually converge.
> 
> Could it say something to the effect of:
> 
> The key derivation function HKDF-SHA256 MUST be supported in LISP-SEC
> implementations.  LISP-SEC deployments SHOULD use the HKDF-SHA256 HKDF
> function, unless older implementations using HKDF-SHA1-128 are present in the
> same deployment.
> 
> However, since HKDF-SHA1-128 and HKDF-SHA256 are supported, the process will
> eventually converge.

Yes, good idea. THe text makes sense and makes LISP-Sec even more robust.


> 
> -- Section 8.5.  Add HKDF-SHA256 to the "LISP-SEC Authentication Data Key
>   Derivation Function ID" registry
> 

Yep.


> 
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> COMMENT:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> Thank you to Alexey Melnikov for the SECDIR review.
> 
> ** Section 4.
>   In this
>   way the ETR can maliciously redirect traffic directed to a large
>   number of hosts.
> 
> Does the number of impact host matter so much as the generic ability to
> redirect traffic?  I’m imagining that a “surgical” or targeted attack might be
> equally interesting – for example, if there was a particular services on a
> given prefix that an attacker wanted to redirect.

You are right. It works both ways.
The text can simply state: “… the ETR can maliciously redirect traffic." 


> 
> ** Section 5.
> 
>   Those trust relationships are used to securely
>   distribute, as described in Section 8.4, ...
> 
> Is Section 8.4, really the right reference here?
> 
> ** Section 6.5
>   Implementations of this specification MUST support OTK Wrapping ID
>   AES-KEY-WRAP-128+HKDF-SHA256 that specifies the use of the HKDF-
>   SHA256 Key Derivation Function specified in [RFC4868]
> 
> RFC4868 doesn’t define a HKDF with SHA256.  Do you mean RFC5869?  Same issue in
> Section 8.4 (IANA table)

Will be replaced.

> 
> ** Section 6.5
>   4.  The per-message encryption key is computed as:
> 
>       *  per-msg-key = KDF( nonce + s + PSK[Key ID] )
>       where the nonce is the value in the Nonce field of the Map-
>       Request, 's' is the string "OTK-Key-Wrap", and the operation'+'
>       just indicates string concatenation.
> 
> HKDFs typically take one more input, L, the output size.  Since this is tied to
> a particular key wrap the options are more constrained.  AES-KEY-WRAP-128 can
> have both a 128-bit and 192-bit KEK, please explicitly state the expected
> output size.


128 bits is the expected output size.

> 
> ** Section 7.4
> 
>   As an example, in certain closed and controlled deployments, it is
>   possible that the threat associated with an on-path attacker between
>   the xTR and the Mapping System is very low, and after careful
>   consideration it may be decided to allow a NULL key wrapping
>   algorithm while carrying the OTKs between the xTR and the Mapping
>   System.


> 
> Wouldn’t this violate:
> -- Section 6.4, “ITR-OTK confidentiality and integrity protection MUST be
> provided in the path between the ITR and the Map-Resolver”
> 
> -- Section 6.4, “If the NULL-KEY-WRAP-128 algorithm (see Section 8.4) is
> selected and no other encryption mechanism (e.g.  DTLS) is enabled, in the path
> between the ITR and the Map-Resolver, the Map-Request MUST be dropped and an
> appropriate log action SHOULD be taken”
> 
> -- Section 6.5, “MS-OTK confidentiality and integrity protection MUST be
> provided in    the path between the Map-Server and the ETR.”
> 

Yes it would. The text in section 7.4 needs to be changed, actually dropping altogether the paragraph you are citing.


> ** Section 7.7.  Recommend adding that when DTLS is used it confirmed to
> RFC7525, or even better would be draft-ietf-uta-rfc7525bis.

Will be updated

> 
> ** Editorial
> -- Section 6.2.  Typo. s/authetification/authentication/
> 
> -- Section 6.3.  Typo. s/Extentions/Extensions/
> 
> 
> 

Thanks will be fixed.

Do the above proposed changes address your comments?

Ciao

L.