Re: [lisp] [Ila] LISP for ILA

Tom Herbert <> Fri, 16 March 2018 19:10 UTC

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From: Tom Herbert <>
Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2018 12:10:41 -0700
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To: Dino Farinacci <>
Cc: Florin Coras <>, "Alberto Rodriguez Natal (natal)" <>, "" <>, "" <>, David Meyer <>
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Subject: Re: [lisp] [Ila] LISP for ILA
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On Fri, Mar 16, 2018 at 11:41 AM, Dino Farinacci <> wrote:
>> Detecting that something is under DOS attack is not problem. It’s
> I do think it is a problem. Because you can’t tell sometimes if it is a high-rate due to high demand from good actors. From the mapping system’s perspective, you don’t know the traffic patterns so you don’t know that if a source-EID wants to talk to 100 EIDs if that is a good actor or a bad actor. If that source-EID is my phone, then it may be suspect, but if it’s a Google server talking to 100 phones, that is pretty normal.
>> pretty obvious when a device is getting flooded which a bunch of
>> spoofed SYNs for example. The problem is trying to find that one SYN
>> packet in a thousand that is not part of the attack and is actually
> Right, at cisco, we called that “the needle in the haystack problem”. And it comes up when we talk about topics of “punt path” in routers and DoS attacks.
>> legitimate. Again this is not easy because the attacker is purposely
>> trying to prevent this determination. AFAIK this is a generally
> Yep, that’s right.
>> unsolved problem and probably impossible to fully solve. So if the
> Agree. We should look at the honey-pot solutions that DNS has used. But its a different animal though than packet attacks.
>> reaction to the attack is to stop all requests and that one legitimate
>> flow is blocked from making progress, then it would seen the DOS
>> attack is successful.
> That isn’t what would happen with the frequency-hopping idea. If the map-resolver is aggressive in dropping and it drops the needles, those ITRs have a back-up or parallel plan to get their requests resolved from other map-resolvers in the mapping system. Be them part of an anycast group or not.

Such complexity is why I am still keen on the redirect model for a
mapping system. An ILA cache is an optional element and the control
plane is never inline with packet forwarding and packets are not
dropped on a cache miss. Neither does the generate request packets for
bogus addresses that can't resolved. These properties bound the worse
case DOS attack to be that legitimate traffic takes an unoptimized
route but is not blocked nor dropped. Conservatively, this does
require provisioning ILA-Rs to handle the full load if necessary to be


> Dino