Re: [lisp] Martin Duke's Discuss on draft-ietf-lisp-rfc6830bis-32: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

Martin, I want to check one aspect of your response about MTU handling.

The entity which is originating the packets, and receiving the ICMP 
responses, is the ITR.  In most cases, the ITR is a router.  I do not 
know of any tunnel protocol for rotuers that expects the routers to 
store state about the packets it has sent in the tunnels.
As these are low-state tunnels, and as the packets are those provided by 
the sources behind the ITR, I doubt that we can use PLPMTUD, although I 
would be happy to be given enough information to find I am wrong about that.

I am somewhat confused as to what you would have us do.
Yours,
Joel

On 8/6/2020 4:35 PM, Martin Duke wrote:
> Hi Albert,
> 
> thanks for the edits, and sorry for the delay! We're not quite there on 
> a few of the items:
> 
> Though first, there is now a duplicate paragraph in Section 7. Please 
> delete one.
> 
> On Fri, Jul 31, 2020 at 5:43 AM Albert Cabellos 
> <albert.cabellos@gmail.com <mailto:albert.cabellos@gmail.com>> wrote:
> 
> 
>     On Fri, Jul 3, 2020 at 9:07 PM Martin Duke via Datatracker
>     <noreply@ietf.org <mailto:noreply@ietf.org>> wrote:
> 
>          >
> 
>      > Sec 5.3 What is in the Nonce/Map-Version field if both the N and
>     V bits are
>      > zero?
>      >
> 
>     There is no field then.
> 
> 
> so the bits are set to zero, or is the LISP header actually shorter by 3 
> octets?
> 
> 
>      >
>      > Sec 7.2 The stateful MTU design does not incorporate any security
>     measures
>      > against ICMP spoofing. At the very least, the ITR needs to make
>     sure that some
>      > fields in the outer IP and UDP headers are hard to guess, and
>     that this
>      > information is stored to verify that the ICMP message came from
>     on-path. If
>      > this is not possible, the design is not safe to use over IPv4.  If
>      > hard-to-guess information is not available to be stored deeper in
>     the packet,
>      > then it is not safe over IPv6 either.
>      >
> 
>     The source UDP port is random. We have therefore added the following
>     statement at the beginning of section 7.7:
> 
>             An ITR stateful solution to handle MTU issues is described
>         as follows, this solution can only be used with
>         IPv4-encapsulated packets:
> 
> 
> This is backwards, and anyway inadequate.
> 
> An off-path attacker can generate a fairly small number of ICMP messages 
> to reduce the MTU to ridiculously low levels (e.g. 68 bytes), which 
> depending on tunneling overhead could render the path unusable. The 
> defense against this is to either ignore ICMP messages (instead using 
> PLPMTUD 
> <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tsvwg-datagram-plpmtud/> to 
> find the MTU) or to compare the echoed information the ICMP message 
> against the stored contents of the packet, where obviously there needs 
> to be enough entropy to make it hard to guess. Generally the port is not 
> sufficient entropy, since it takes fewer than 2^16 packets to take you 
> down, but admittedly there isn't much UDP-based protocols can do about this.
> 
> In IPv6, the router should include as much of the packet as possible in 
> the ICMP packet, so the chance of guessing is low. It's therefore it's 
> simply a matter of specifying that hosts should store the packet payload 
> and do the validation step.
> 
> In IPv4, the router is required to include the first 8 bytes of the IP 
> payload (eg the UDP header), so all you have are the IP and UDP headers. 
> Hosts should still do the validation.
> 
> The main thing is to tell them to do that validation.
> 
> 
>      >
>      > Sec 7.2 There is a fourth situation which can arise. If the ETR
>     receives an
>      > ICMP packet from an EID in its network. I have a couple of
>     questions about what
>      > should happen in this case:
>      >
> 
>     In this case the EID is locally attached to the xTR. Therefore, the
>     xTR has a locally configured MTU to reach the EID. So what is
>     written in the section already covers this scenario.
> 
>      >
>      > - How is this communicated to the sender of the flow that
>     triggered the
>      > message? Is there an "outer" ICMP to the ITR, and "inner" ICMP to
>     the source
>      > EID, both, or neither?
>      >
>      > - Is the ETR responsible for enforcing the MTU to that EID for
>     subsequent flows?
>      >
> 
> 
> I read 7.2 again and I don't see that it does. According to this 
> section, what does the ETR do when it receives a packet from the ITR 
> that exceeds the locally configured MTU?
> 
> Martin
> 
> _______________________________________________
> lisp mailing list
> lisp@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/lisp
> 