Re: [lisp] Martin Duke's Discuss on draft-ietf-lisp-rfc6830bis-32: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

["Joel M. Halpern" <[e-mail]>]

Exploring Martin's second comment, I looked at section 7.2 of the draft. 
  I do not see any obvious reason why this section is restricted to 
IPv4.  If there is a reason, we need to state it.  If there is no 
reason, we should allow it for the v6 case as well.

Yours,
Joel

On 8/6/2020 6:24 PM, Martin Duke wrote:
> Hi Joel,
> 
> I'm realizing that we may not have a consensus document that provides 
> good guidance on how to proceed. I'm going to consult with a couple of 
> SMEs and come up with a reasonable recommendation. This shouldn't take 
> any more than a couple of days.
> 
> However the "IPv4 only" recommendation is just wrong and should be reverted.
> 
> On Thu, Aug 6, 2020 at 1:48 PM Joel M. Halpern <[e-mail] 
> <mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
> 
>     Martin, I want to check one aspect of your response about MTU handling.
> 
>     The entity which is originating the packets, and receiving the ICMP
>     responses, is the ITR.  In most cases, the ITR is a router.  I do not
>     know of any tunnel protocol for rotuers that expects the routers to
>     store state about the packets it has sent in the tunnels.
>     As these are low-state tunnels, and as the packets are those
>     provided by
>     the sources behind the ITR, I doubt that we can use PLPMTUD, although I
>     would be happy to be given enough information to find I am wrong
>     about that.
> 
>     I am somewhat confused as to what you would have us do.
>     Yours,
>     Joel
> 
>     On 8/6/2020 4:35 PM, Martin Duke wrote:
>      > Hi Albert,
>      >
>      > thanks for the edits, and sorry for the delay! We're not quite
>     there on
>      > a few of the items:
>      >
>      > Though first, there is now a duplicate paragraph in Section 7.
>     Please
>      > delete one.
>      >
>      > On Fri, Jul 31, 2020 at 5:43 AM Albert Cabellos
>      > <[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>
>     <mailto:[e-mail]
>     <mailto:[e-mail]>>> wrote:
>      >
>      >
>      >     On Fri, Jul 3, 2020 at 9:07 PM Martin Duke via Datatracker
>      >     <[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>
>     <mailto:[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>>> wrote:
>      >
>      >          >
>      >
>      >      > Sec 5.3 What is in the Nonce/Map-Version field if both the
>     N and
>      >     V bits are
>      >      > zero?
>      >      >
>      >
>      >     There is no field then.
>      >
>      >
>      > so the bits are set to zero, or is the LISP header actually
>     shorter by 3
>      > octets?
>      >
>      >
>      >      >
>      >      > Sec 7.2 The stateful MTU design does not incorporate any
>     security
>      >     measures
>      >      > against ICMP spoofing. At the very least, the ITR needs to
>     make
>      >     sure that some
>      >      > fields in the outer IP and UDP headers are hard to guess, and
>      >     that this
>      >      > information is stored to verify that the ICMP message came
>     from
>      >     on-path. If
>      >      > this is not possible, the design is not safe to use over
>     IPv4.  If
>      >      > hard-to-guess information is not available to be stored
>     deeper in
>      >     the packet,
>      >      > then it is not safe over IPv6 either.
>      >      >
>      >
>      >     The source UDP port is random. We have therefore added the
>     following
>      >     statement at the beginning of section 7.7:
>      >
>      >             An ITR stateful solution to handle MTU issues is
>     described
>      >         as follows, this solution can only be used with
>      >         IPv4-encapsulated packets:
>      >
>      >
>      > This is backwards, and anyway inadequate.
>      >
>      > An off-path attacker can generate a fairly small number of ICMP
>     messages
>      > to reduce the MTU to ridiculously low levels (e.g. 68 bytes), which
>      > depending on tunneling overhead could render the path unusable. The
>      > defense against this is to either ignore ICMP messages (instead
>     using
>      > PLPMTUD
>      >
>     <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tsvwg-datagram-plpmtud/> to
> 
>      > find the MTU) or to compare the echoed information the ICMP message
>      > against the stored contents of the packet, where obviously there
>     needs
>      > to be enough entropy to make it hard to guess. Generally the port
>     is not
>      > sufficient entropy, since it takes fewer than 2^16 packets to
>     take you
>      > down, but admittedly there isn't much UDP-based protocols can do
>     about this.
>      >
>      > In IPv6, the router should include as much of the packet as
>     possible in
>      > the ICMP packet, so the chance of guessing is low. It's therefore
>     it's
>      > simply a matter of specifying that hosts should store the packet
>     payload
>      > and do the validation step.
>      >
>      > In IPv4, the router is required to include the first 8 bytes of
>     the IP
>      > payload (eg the UDP header), so all you have are the IP and UDP
>     headers.
>      > Hosts should still do the validation.
>      >
>      > The main thing is to tell them to do that validation.
>      >
>      >
>      >      >
>      >      > Sec 7.2 There is a fourth situation which can arise. If
>     the ETR
>      >     receives an
>      >      > ICMP packet from an EID in its network. I have a couple of
>      >     questions about what
>      >      > should happen in this case:
>      >      >
>      >
>      >     In this case the EID is locally attached to the xTR.
>     Therefore, the
>      >     xTR has a locally configured MTU to reach the EID. So what is
>      >     written in the section already covers this scenario.
>      >
>      >      >
>      >      > - How is this communicated to the sender of the flow that
>      >     triggered the
>      >      > message? Is there an "outer" ICMP to the ITR, and "inner"
>     ICMP to
>      >     the source
>      >      > EID, both, or neither?
>      >      >
>      >      > - Is the ETR responsible for enforcing the MTU to that EID for
>      >     subsequent flows?
>      >      >
>      >
>      >
>      > I read 7.2 again and I don't see that it does. According to this
>      > section, what does the ETR do when it receives a packet from the ITR
>      > that exceeds the locally configured MTU?
>      >
>      > Martin
>      >
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