Re: [lisp] Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-ietf-lisp-rfc6830bis-32: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

[Albert Cabellos <[e-mail]>]

Hi,

Thanks for your comments, we have updated the draft accordingly (-28):

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lisp-rfc6830bis/


Find below the specific changes and responses to your comments:

On Wed, Jul 8, 2020 at 12:04 AM Roman Danyliw via Datatracker <
[e-mail]> wrote:
>
> Roman Danyliw has entered the following ballot position for
> draft-ietf-lisp-rfc6830bis-32: Discuss
>
> When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
> email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this
> introductory paragraph, however.)
>
>
> Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html
> for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
>
>
> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lisp-rfc6830bis/
>
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> DISCUSS:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> ** Section 1.1. The applicability statement of “large set of cooperating
> entities seeking to communicate over the public Internet or other large
> underlay IP infrastructures” seems inconsistent with many of the protocol
> mechanics described.  Specifically, most of the capabilities in the LISP
header
> (Locator-Status-Bits, Echo-nonce mechanism, Map-Versioning, Instance ID)
and
> the “Gleaning mechanism” are explicitly noted as not being suitable for
> Internet use.  This section needs to be explicit that only a subset of the
> protocol is suitable for the Internet.  Likewise, it should be clearer
about
> what is assumed elements of the closed network are trusted for what
particular
> behaviors.
>

 We have added this to the following new section (section 4.1):

4.1.  Deployment on the Public Internet
   Several of the mechanisms in this document are intended for
   deployment in controlled, trusted environments, and are insecure for
   use over the public Internet.  In particular, on the public internet
   xTRs:
   o  MUST set the N, L, E, and V bits in the LISP header (Section 5.1)
      to zero.
   o  MUST NOT use Locator-Status-Bits and echo-nonce, as described in
      Section 10 for Routing Locator Reachability.  Instead MUST rely
      solely on control-plane methods.
   o  MUST NOT use Gleaning or Locator-Status-Bits and Map-Versioning,
      as described in Section 13 to update the EID-to-RLOC Mappings.
      Instead relying solely on control-plane methods.



>
> ** Section 16. Per “Locator-Status-Bits, echo-nonce and map-versioning
SHOULD

> NOT be used over the public Internet and SHOULD only be used in trusted
and

> closed deployments” -- not disagreement.  However, under what
circumstances
> would they be used on the internet to warrant a SHOULD NOT instead of a
> stronger MUST NOT?
>

Gleaning, Locator-Status-Bits, echo-nonce and Map-Versioning elevated to
MUST NOT.

> ** Section 8.  Per “Participants within a LISP deployment must agree on
the
> meaning of Instance ID values.  The source and destination EIDs MUST
belong to
> the same Instance ID.”  Could parties agree that the Instance ID is
802.1Q tags
> and send those across the internet?  Recommend stronger cautionary
language on
> using Instance ID.
>

We don´t want to specifically restrict communications between different
Instance IDs, this is up to the deployer. Yes, Instance ID can be used to
carry 802.1Q tags, this is an example stated in the document.

>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> COMMENT:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Thank you for being responsive to the prior security feedback from the
SECDIR
> (and thanks to Kyle Rose for performing it) and Security ADs in the
return of
> this document to the telechat.
>
> I support Martin Duke’s DISCUSS position and endorse the creation of a
> dedicated section covering which protocol features should not be used on
the
> internet.
>
> **  Section 4.0.  Per “… this document recommends that a maximum of two
LISP
> headers …”, should a normative RECOMMENDED be used here instead?
>

Changed, thanks


> ** Section 5.3. Per “However, the same nonce can be used for a period of
time
> when encapsulating to the same ETR.”, should this be bounded, even
> qualitatively?
>

I have removed this sentence, so the same nonce can not be used when
encapsulating to the same ETR.

> ** Section 9.
>       A
>       "gleaned" Map-Cache entry is only stored and used for a few
>       seconds, pending verification.  Verification is performed by
>       sending a Map-Request to the source EID (the inner-header IP
>       source address) of the received encapsulated packet.
>
> -- Is there any more precision that could be provided about the cache
lifetime
> beyond “a few seconds”
>
> -- Should normative language be provided that this cache should be aged
and
> verification performed?

Changed to:

 “A "gleaned" Map-Cache entry is only stored and used for a RECOMMENDED
period of 3 seconds, pending verification.  Verification MUST be performed
by …”


>
> ** Editorial Nit
> -- Section 13.2. Typo s/synzhronization/ synchronization/
>
>

Changed, thanks!

Albert
>