Re: [lisp] Roman Danyliw's No Objection on draft-ietf-lisp-gpe-17: (with COMMENT)

["Fabio Maino (fmaino)" <[e-mail]>]

Hi Roman, 
Thanks for your review. 

We have added the following sentence at the end of section 4.4: 

   "Refer to Section 7 for consideration about the use of integrity
   protection for deployments, such as the public Internet, concerned
   with on-path attackers."

And changed section 7 into: 

   "LISP-GPE, as many encapsulations that use optional extensions, is
   subject to on-path adversaries that can make arbitrary modifications
   to the packet (including the P-Bit) to change or remove any part of
   the payload, or claim to encapsulate any protocol payload type.
   Typical integrity protection mechanisms (such as IPsec) SHOULD be
   used in combination with LISP-GPE by those protocol extensions that
   want to protect from on-path attackers."

Diffs with rev -18 are attached. 

Thanks,
Fabio


On 7/8/20, 3:08 PM, "Roman Danyliw via Datatracker" <[e-mail]> wrote:

    Roman Danyliw has entered the following ballot position for
    draft-ietf-lisp-gpe-17: No Objection

    When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
    email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this
    introductory paragraph, however.)


    Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html
    for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.


    The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
    https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lisp-gpe/



    ----------------------------------------------------------------------
    COMMENT:
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------

    Section 4.  Per “When a LISP-GPE router performs Ethernet encapsulation, the
    inner header 802.1Q [IEEE.802.1Q_2014] VLAN Identifier (VID) MAY be mapped to,
    or used to determine the LISP Instance IDentifier (IID) field”, as noted in a
    DISCUSS item in my ballot on draft-ietf-lisp-rfc6830bis-32, using Instance ID
    values as 802.1Q tags without integrity protection seems problematic in the
    public internet scenario.  Please add cautionary language recommending
    integrity protection.


    Section 7.  Per “LISP-GPE, as many encapsulations that use optional extensions,
    is subject to on-path adversaries that by manipulating the P-Bit and the packet
    itself can remove part of the payload or claim to encapsulate any protocol
    payload type”, it’s worse than that – (in the absence of integrity protection
    and like LISP in general) an on-path attacker make arbitrary modifications to
    the packet (like a 802.1Q tag in the encapsulated ethernet; or the Instance ID
    using an 802.1.Q tag)