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Re: [Lwip] [IPsec] Number of fixed SPI

Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> Fri, 24 March 2017 22:30 UTC

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Date: Fri, 24 Mar 2017 18:30:04 -0400
From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: Daniel Migault <daniel.migault@ericsson.com>
cc: "lwip@ietf.org" <lwip@ietf.org>, IPsecME WG <ipsec@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Lwip] [IPsec] Number of fixed SPI
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On Fri, 24 Mar 2017, Daniel Migault wrote:

> I have a question regarding devices that are not able to randomly generate SPI, but instead
> store fix values.  The question is how much fix values could be provisioned.

This is pretty dangerous. Half a year ago or so we saw the Transcript
Collsion Attacks that could have succeeded if we hadn't used random
SPI numbers to prevent pre-calculation in the attack. Using a set of 10
non-random SPI numbers would potentially make this device vulnerable to
this attack.

Paul

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