Return-Path: X-Original-To: lwip@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: lwip@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id BA84A120937 for ; Mon, 20 Jan 2020 09:00:42 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -12.502 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-12.502 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIMWL_WL_HIGH=-0.001, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, HK_SCAM=1.999, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-5, SPF_PASS=-0.001, USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL=-7.5] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=cisco.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id xsql7F8UtOOa for ; Mon, 20 Jan 2020 09:00:29 -0800 (PST) Received: from aer-iport-4.cisco.com (aer-iport-4.cisco.com [173.38.203.54]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 314C21200A1 for ; Mon, 20 Jan 2020 09:00:29 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=cisco.com; i=@cisco.com; l=11724; q=dns/txt; s=iport; t=1579539629; x=1580749229; h=from:message-id:mime-version:subject:date:in-reply-to:cc: to:references; bh=cCXrN348qgqXAbh3UIpLsY1ednEDRR3FHp1I34+0XPI=; b=YEvsFaAIh+q5W2L7Q8k8YRh3vXItLa/Gti0rE2+uF7DqLvq3nu5+G9Hw MKEhnwoTOodOY/u5F0HZYT3wsSxmVUROfJyd7XbAdPUrjL15oUUAlMy8j FEfA7Hf9NB/l8TCOSGU2GcsYAYPihW3UDqUT4f0psEDTelEKJAkVXY7kQ o=; X-Files: signature.asc : 488 X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Filtered: true X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Result: =?us-ascii?q?A0AZAABV2yVe/xbLJq1lGgEBAQEBAQE?= =?us-ascii?q?BAQMBAQEBEQEBAQICAQEBAYFqAgEBAQELAYF8LGxQBSASKoQSiQOIIYEBkiu?= =?us-ascii?q?GJIFnAgcBAQEJAwEBJQoBAYRAAoIzNwYOAgMNAQEEAQEBAgEFBG2FCwYmDIV?= =?us-ascii?q?eAQEBAQIBI1YFCwsYKgICVwYTFIMSAYJbIA+rRHWBMoQ1AYEUhF4KBoE4AYF?= =?us-ascii?q?SiluCAIERJyCBTkk1PoJkAQKBJiaDJjKCLASNcolAmCCCQ4JJgRyDWI50G5p?= =?us-ascii?q?3lz+OeIMtAgQGBQIVgWgjKg2BITMaCBsVZQGCQT4SGA1WhA6ERAEMgj+KVEA?= =?us-ascii?q?DMAKNcgEB?= X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.70,342,1574121600"; d="asc'?scan'208,217";a="22270281" Received: from aer-iport-nat.cisco.com (HELO aer-core-3.cisco.com) ([173.38.203.22]) by aer-iport-4.cisco.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA; 20 Jan 2020 17:00:27 +0000 Received: from dhcp-10-61-103-205.cisco.com (dhcp-10-61-103-205.cisco.com [10.61.103.205]) by aer-core-3.cisco.com (8.15.2/8.15.2) with ESMTPS id 00KH0Pho017141 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NO); Mon, 20 Jan 2020 17:00:26 GMT From: Eliot Lear Message-Id: Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="Apple-Mail=_092C72A0-1CF3-46BE-97A7-907A73A41C5C"; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; micalg=pgp-sha256 Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 13.0 \(3608.40.2.2.4\)) Date: Mon, 20 Jan 2020 18:00:25 +0100 In-Reply-To: <247FD52A-D90D-498E-AD79-9DADA8653EB2@eggert.org> Cc: =?utf-8?B?0JLQsNGB0LjQu9C40Lkg0JTQvtC70LzQsNGC0L7Qsg==?= , "t2trg@irtf.org" , Dave Oran , "lwip@ietf.org" To: Lars Eggert References: <6CB4D459-4AAA-4313-B95C-05DF22C9A9DD@eggert.org> <6B9FFEF5-CDC9-4703-BB10-616DBEDE80AB@gmail.com> <4528ED27-E3B6-43C4-99A5-715DE1B79A09@cisco.com> <247FD52A-D90D-498E-AD79-9DADA8653EB2@eggert.org> X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.3608.40.2.2.4) X-Outbound-SMTP-Client: 10.61.103.205, dhcp-10-61-103-205.cisco.com X-Outbound-Node: aer-core-3.cisco.com Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Lwip] [T2TRG] QUIC on IoT boards X-BeenThere: lwip@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: "Lightweight IP stack. Official mailing list for IETF LWIG Working Group." List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 20 Jan 2020 17:00:43 -0000 --Apple-Mail=_092C72A0-1CF3-46BE-97A7-907A73A41C5C Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="Apple-Mail=_596C52EF-5121-4F9F-87E9-BF2021391C68" --Apple-Mail=_596C52EF-5121-4F9F-87E9-BF2021391C68 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Hi Lars, > On 20 Jan 2020, at 16:08, Lars Eggert wrote: >=20 > Hi, >=20 > On 2020-1-20, at 16:52, Eliot Lear wrote: >> =E2=80=A2 I only want that device speaking protocols it was = designed to speak. >>=20 >> It=E2=80=99s that last one that has me worried from a long term = perspective with QUIC. >=20 > I don't quite follow. Surely if someone ships an IoT device that uses = QUIC for communication, that *is* a device "designed to speak" QUIC? QUIC is the substrate. It=E2=80=99s the applications atop that really = are at issue. >=20 >> If the stack hides means to determine directionality, as it does, and = applications, as it does, we should take a pause to determine how we = would detect whether it has services running on it that aren=E2=80=99t = intended, as has happened all too often.[1]. These are use cases that = QUIC was not designed to address. >=20 > So [1] is a case where the firmware web server had an embarrassing bug = - it's not an example where someone hacked in and ran another service in = addition to (or instead of) the manufacturer one. So that's not a = fitting example for the point you are trying to raise. Yes it is. It=E2=80=99s a misconfiguration that could easily be blocked = with the existing TCP model, and it was in a great many environments. = With QUIC, spotting these sorts of misconfigurations may prove more = difficult. Not impossible, mind you. >=20 > We can certainly debate whether more encryption and/or obfuscation = makes network-based threat detection harder or not. It might even be the = case that there are wrinkles in the IoT space that aren't there in the = broader web space, in terms of appropriateness or trade-offs. But in = general, I think this issue is a general one, and not IoT-specific. Let=E2=80=99s agree that IoT is a pretty big category. I gave you two = very specific examples of where TLS 1.3 itself is more of a hindrance = than a help because of the nature of the system in play. Those examples = comprise a common case for IoT. I would never say the same thing about = browser based communications. Because IoT is such a big category, there = may be cases where privacy issues either conflict with or will overtake = other concerns. Let me give you a good example of conflict: Dad wants to know what information daughter=E2=80=99s Internet toy is = exfiltrating and to whom. Does the toy have a camera or a microphone = that wasn=E2=80=99t advertised in the documentation, as happened with = one particular device[1]? On the other hand, dad would very much like = whatever information is being shared to only be shared with authorized = parties. Want more conflict? Let=E2=80=99s assume that the CPAP machine I = described above uses my local wifi and something goes wrong, and the = patient dies. The next of kin want the data, but the CPAP service owner = refuses. In fact, the CPAP service owner even refuses to describe what = data is being collected. On the other hand, a patient would very much = like whatever information is being shared to only be shared with = authorized parties (2nd verse, same as the first). Now=E2=80=A6 some of this is encryption and some of this is transport, = but the QUIC and H3 have intentionally intertwined the two to attempt to = reduce middle box interference. That very interference is what a great = many IoT deployments need. >=20 >> On the other hand, we do want the IoT community to leverage the best = that the Web community has delivered, if and when it is appropriate, and = even when the whole package is not, it is best that they adopt the = components that are, so that they don=E2=80=99t end up having to repeat = old mistakes. >=20 > Exactly. Given the ever increasing amount of engineering cycles that = are being poured into QUIC, the IoT community should absolutely try to = leverage that to the max, where it can. But the community also requires guidance to understand where it is = appropriate, and quite frankly I don=E2=80=99t think we know that yet. Eliot [1] = https://edition.cnn.com/2019/02/20/tech/google-nest-microphone-secret/inde= x.html --Apple-Mail=_596C52EF-5121-4F9F-87E9-BF2021391C68 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Hi = Lars,

On 20 Jan 2020, at 16:08, Lars Eggert <lars@eggert.org> = wrote:

Hi,

On 2020-1-20, at 16:52, = Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com> wrote:
=E2=80=A2 I only want that device = speaking protocols it was designed to speak.

It=E2=80=99s that last one that has me worried from a long = term perspective with QUIC.

I = don't quite follow. Surely if someone ships an IoT device that uses QUIC = for communication, that *is* a device "designed to speak" QUIC?

QUIC is = the substrate.  It=E2=80=99s the applications atop that really are = at issue.

If the stack hides means to determine directionality, as it = does, and applications, as it does, we should take a pause to determine = how we would detect whether it has services running on it that aren=E2=80=99= t intended, as has happened all too often.[1]. These are use cases that = QUIC was not designed to address.

So [1] is a case where the firmware web server had an = embarrassing bug - it's not an example where someone hacked in and ran = another service in addition to (or instead of) the manufacturer one. So = that's not a fitting example for the point you are trying to raise.

Yes it is. =  It=E2=80=99s a misconfiguration that could easily be blocked with = the existing TCP model, and it was in a great many environments. =  With QUIC, spotting these sorts of misconfigurations may prove = more difficult.  Not impossible, mind you.


We can certainly debate whether more = encryption and/or obfuscation makes network-based threat detection = harder or not. It might even be the case that there are wrinkles in the = IoT space that aren't there in the broader web space, in terms of = appropriateness or trade-offs. But in general, I think this issue is a = general one, and not IoT-specific.

Let=E2=80= =99s agree that IoT is a pretty big category.  I gave you two very = specific examples of where TLS 1.3 itself is more of a hindrance than a = help because of the nature of the system in play.  Those examples = comprise a common case for IoT.  I would never say the same thing = about browser based communications.  Because IoT is such a big = category, there may be cases where privacy issues either conflict with = or will overtake other concerns.

Let = me give you a good example of conflict:

Dad wants to know what information daughter=E2=80=99= s Internet toy is exfiltrating and to whom.  Does the toy have a = camera or a microphone that wasn=E2=80=99t advertised in the = documentation, as happened with one particular device[1]?  On the = other hand, dad would very much like whatever information is being = shared to only be shared with authorized = parties.

Want more conflict? =  Let=E2=80=99s assume that the CPAP machine I described above uses = my local wifi and something goes wrong, and the patient dies.  The = next of kin want the data, but the CPAP service owner refuses.  In = fact, the CPAP service owner even refuses to describe what data is being = collected.  On the other hand, a patient would very much like = whatever information is being shared to only be shared with authorized parties (2nd verse, = same as the first).

Now=E2=80=A6 = some of this is encryption and some of this is transport, but the QUIC = and H3 have intentionally intertwined the two to attempt to reduce = middle box interference.  That very interference is what a great = many IoT deployments need.


On the other hand, we do = want the IoT community to leverage the best that the Web community has = delivered, if and when it is appropriate, and even when the whole = package is not, it is best that they adopt the components that are, so = that they don=E2=80=99t end up having to repeat old mistakes.

Exactly. Given the ever = increasing amount of engineering cycles that are being poured into QUIC, = the IoT community should absolutely try to leverage that to the max, = where it can.

But the community also requires guidance to understand = where it is appropriate, and quite frankly I don=E2=80=99t think we know = that yet.

Eliot


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