Re: [Madinas] identities for legitimate devices

Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> Wed, 04 November 2020 19:20 UTC

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From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
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Date: Wed, 04 Nov 2020 14:20:23 -0500
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Subject: Re: [Madinas] identities for legitimate devices
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    > On 04/11/2020 16:54, Michael Richardson wrote:
    >> But, the key (pun intended), in my opinion, is to change the device
    >> identity from being a MAC address to being a key.

Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
    > While agreeing with the goal (for home networks and similar) I'd word
    > it differently - such n/w's often do not need to identify a specific
    > device, they only need to authorise access to the network.  A common
    > PSK can be fine for that.

A common PSK means that one can not determine which device has become infected.

Is your objection based upon privacy implications of a device doing EAP-TLS
with a home router?  The device would reveal it's client certificate to an
on-path/MITM/malicious-messenger attacker.
Noting that the identity in an LDevID could be arbitrary, but of course, the
public key would still identity the device.

A unique-per-device PSK does not suffer the same, but is presently hard to
provision.

--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>   . o O ( IPv6 IøT consulting )
           Sandelman Software Works Inc, Ottawa and Worldwide