Re: [manet] Stephen Farrell's Discuss on draft-ietf-manet-olsrv2-sec-threats-03: (with DISCUSS)

Jiazi Yi <ietf@jiaziyi.com> Wed, 11 January 2017 23:25 UTC

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From: Jiazi Yi <ietf@jiaziyi.com>
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To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Cc: draft-ietf-manet-olsrv2-sec-threats@ietf.org, manet <manet@ietf.org>, "Dearlove, Christopher \(UK\)" <Chris.Dearlove@baesystems.com>, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, Mobile Ad-hoc Networks Working Group <manet-chairs@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [manet] Stephen Farrell's Discuss on draft-ietf-manet-olsrv2-sec-threats-03: (with DISCUSS)
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Hi, 

Thanks very much for the comments and the reply from Chris. 

> On 5 Jan 2017, at 14:27, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
> 
> Stephen Farrell has entered the following ballot position for
> draft-ietf-manet-olsrv2-sec-threats-03: Discuss
> 
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> 
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> DISCUSS:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> 
> I have two things I'd like to discuss to see if
> changes are needed or not:
> 
> (1) Neither this nor RFC7186 seem to consider battery
> depletion attacks. Why is that ok?

The battery depletion is a kind of attacks by consuming extra resources. In RFC7186, we mentioned:

   In some MANETs, the routers are powered by battery.  Another
   consequence of a DoS attack in such networks is that the power will
   be drained quickly by unnecessary processing, transmitting, and
   receiving of messages.

And it’s true that we didn’t call it out in the current draft. We made it more explicit in the new revision:

   In a different
   class of attacks, a compromised OLSRv2 router injects control
   traffic, designed so as to cause an in-router resource exhaustion,
   e.g., by causing the algorithms calculating routing tables or MPR
   sets to be invoked continuously, preventing the internal state of a
   router from converging, depleting the energy of battery-driven
   routers, etc.


> 
> (2) 6.2: HMAC is *not* a digital signature mechanism.
> While loose terminology may be ok elsewhere, in this
> case, you shouldn't do that as it can lead to wrong
> conclusions. Digital signatures do provide origin
> authentication of sorts, but MACs do not, especially
> if keys are shared. It is not clear to me that some of
> the claims in 6.2.x of attacks being mitigated are in
> fact correct, given shared secrets. (Note: It could be
> that the claims are correct, I didn't have time to
> check back on all the vulnerability definitions,
> sorry. But I'd like to check, given the defective
> terminology.)

We updated the term used and the phrase that Chris mentioned. 

thanks very much!

regards

Jiazi 

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