Re: [manet] Message integrity and message mutability (was RE: draft-ietf-manet-aodvv2-13 review - a couple of big ticket Items)

[Victoria Mercieca <[e-mail]>]

Hi Jiazi,

Thanks for your response. So you think we could change back to sending RREP
by unicast (letting an implementation handle whether this requires a route
to the neighbor to be installed temporarily)? We would have to also send a
separate message to request an acknowledgement, but this could also be
unicast and could therefore potentially be sent in the same RFC5444 packet.

Anyone have any objections?

Kind regards,
Victoria.

On Wed, Apr 27, 2016 at 11:34 PM, Jiazi YI <[e-mail]> wrote:

>
>
> On Wed, Apr 27, 2016 at 10:59 PM, Victoria Mercieca <[e-mail]>
> wrote:
>
>> Just quickly, on this note, if we remove the AckReq from the RREP itself,
>> then because the RREP is multicast, there might be multiple receivers, but
>> there's no way for them to determine if they were the intended next hop, so
>> they would all have to forward the RREP. The RREP might then go by multiple
>> routes to get to RREQ_Gen. This assumes all receivers of the RREP have a
>> route to OrigAddr anyway (current rules say if they didnt, they would send
>> a RERR back to RREP_Gen).
>>
>> So, do we have to install a route to the neighbour, then unicast the RREP
>> and create a separate message with an AckReq, then if no acknowledgement is
>> received, blacklist the neighbor and remove the route to the neighbor?
>> along with the route to OrigAddr which is not available because the link is
>> not bidirectional...?
>>
>
> My opinion is, if we have a neighbor address and the interface through
> which the neighbor can be (possibly) reached, then we can send an unicast
> to it.
> The others are more implementation details: for example, if a route to the
> neighbor is required, we can setup a temporary route entry to the neighbor,
> and remove it after the unicast is finished. As it's more implementation, I
> don't think it's necessary to go to the specification.
>
> Another related question: when I was reading the specification, a router
> only sets up routes to the source/destination, but not to its direct
> neighbors?
>
> best
>
> Jiazi
>
>
>>
>> Regards,
>> Victoria.
>>
>> On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 4:34 PM, Justin Dean <[e-mail]>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 11:29 AM, Jiazi YI <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Hi,
>>>>
>>>> Maybe I missed a bit here:
>>>>
>>>> If only the desired receiver of the multicast RREP (carrying a
>>>> destination address) can reply to the multicast RREP, why not using unicast
>>>> directly?
>>>>
>>>> Because the link isn't yet known to be bi-directional and a unicast
>>> route can't be installed yet.
>>>
>>> Justin
>>>
>>>
>>>> best
>>>>
>>>> Jiazi
>>>>
>>>> On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 4:59 PM, Victoria Mercieca <
>>>> [e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Hi Chris,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 3:51 PM, Dearlove, Christopher (UK) <
>>>>> [e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> I has to go back to Victoria’s summary here. It says:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 2) C creates the RREP. Since it doesnt know if the link to B is
>>>>>> bidirectional, it includes the AckReq (an address to indicate that it
>>>>>> expects to receive a RREP_Ack from B).
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That doesn’t actually indicate if that’s C’s address or B’s address
>>>>>> being included. I’d assumed it was C’s address. Your comment makes sense if
>>>>>> it’s B’s address. Reading again, I think you’re probably right. But only
>>>>>> probably. Can we confirm that.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> C creates the RREP. The included AckReq address is B's address. The
>>>>> RREP then gets multicast.
>>>>> B receives it, sees that it own address is marked as the AckReq
>>>>> address, and sends an ack unicast back to C.
>>>>> Anyone else who receives the multicast RREP from C does not send the
>>>>> Ack, since the AckReq address does not match any of their interface
>>>>> addresses.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> I assume you meant that the RREP (not RREP_Ack) is multicast. There’s
>>>>>> a bit of a chicken and egg problem here. We do know how we want to unicast.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The RREP is multicast (when we dont know if the link is
>>>>> bidirectional), the RREP_Ack is always unicast.
>>>>>
>>>>> Kind regards,
>>>>> Vicky.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *-- *
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *Christopher Dearlove Senior Principal Engineer BAE Systems Applied
>>>>>> Intelligence Laboratories *
>>>>>> *__________________________________________________________________________
>>>>>> *
>>>>>> *T*:  [phone]  |  *E: *[e-mail]
>>>>>>
>>>>>> BAE Systems Applied Intelligence, Chelmsford Technology Park, Great
>>>>>> Baddow, Chelmsford, Essex CM2 8HN.
>>>>>> www.baesystems.com/ai
>>>>>>
>>>>>> BAE Systems Applied Intelligence Limited
>>>>>> Registered in England & Wales No: 01337451
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Registered Office: Surrey Research Park, Guildford, Surrey, GU2 7YP
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *From:* Justin Dean [mailto:[e-mail]]
>>>>>> *Sent:* 25 April 2016 15:26
>>>>>> *To:* Thomas Heide Clausen
>>>>>> *Cc:* Dearlove, Christopher (UK); Christopher Dearlove; Mobile Ad
>>>>>> Hoc Networks mailing list; Victoria Mercieca
>>>>>> *Subject:* Re: [manet] Message integrity and message mutability (was
>>>>>> RE: draft-ietf-manet-aodvv2-13 review - a couple of big ticket Items)
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> **** WARNING ****
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *This message originates from outside our organisation, either from
>>>>>> an external partner or the internet.*
>>>>>>
>>>>>> * Consider carefully whether you should click on any links, open any
>>>>>> attachments or reply. For information regarding **Red Flags** that
>>>>>> you can look out for in emails you receive, click here
>>>>>> <http://intranet.ent.baesystems.com/howwework/security/spotlights/Documents/Red%20Flags.pdf>.*
>>>>>> * If you feel the email is suspicious, please follow this process
>>>>>> <http://intranet.ent.baesystems.com/howwework/security/spotlights/Documents/Dealing%20With%20Suspicious%20Emails.pdf>.*
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The address in the RREP_Ack may be required due to the RREP_Ack being
>>>>>> multicast as there is not yet a verified unicast route installed yet.
>>>>>> Going to double check if I'm remembering correctly.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Justin
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 10:18 AM, <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Hi,
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I must admit that while I have reviewed the protocol several times,
>>>>>> I’ve not been digging that deep into the protocol functioning to catch this
>>>>>> issue of how invasive the protocol operations are when forwarding a
>>>>>> message: there were other “major” issues to address (and which obscured the
>>>>>> details), so as a first order: thank you Victoria, for having called
>>>>>> attention to this.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> To the substance of these emails.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I am afraid that I do not understand the use of inserting validity
>>>>>> TLVs while in-flight, into a message. Actually, I am dubious for both the
>>>>>> originator inserting this (how can the originator of a message know how
>>>>>> “latter parts of the path” will be have”) except if we are talking
>>>>>> duty-cycling of devices and inserting “the remaining time that I am going
>>>>>> to be up before I suspend”. Intuitively, that would also assume fairly long
>>>>>> duty cycles “I am up for tens of seconds”, which I am not sure are actually
>>>>>> realistic. And, as Chris says in another email, this is trading off “the
>>>>>> ability to do security” for an unknown/untested feature — which I think is
>>>>>> the wrong trade-off.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On he topic of “needing to put an address in” for RREP-ACK, I must
>>>>>> admit that this seems roundabout. I can see three issues here:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> o I am not sure that adding an address vs. a flag may not have to do
>>>>>> with the “multiple interfaces/
>>>>>>
>>>>>> multiple addresses” discrimination mechanics of the protocol? I
>>>>>> haven’t worked it through, though,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> but that would be a guess.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> o The end-to-end topology diffusion mechanism should not need to be
>>>>>> concerned with the
>>>>>>
>>>>>> “bidirectionally check” of a local link (in part, as it encumbers
>>>>>> security, but not only).  In short, a
>>>>>>
>>>>>> flag or an address, both are (equally) bad.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> o A cleaner mechanism would be a “hello mechanism”, not necessarily
>>>>>> as NHDP, but a “when
>>>>>>
>>>>>> forwarding a RREQ/RREP, trigger a 3-way hello exchange, if the link
>>>>>> is estimated to be of a
>>>>>>
>>>>>> type which potentially can be unidirectional”. There is another
>>>>>> benefit to doing that, see the end
>>>>>>
>>>>>> of this email.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Either way, I do not like the notion of fusing
>>>>>> metrics-and-link-bidirectionality-detection any more than I like fusing
>>>>>> global-topology-diffusion-and-link-bidirectionality-detection.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The solution all this is, to me, threefold
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 1) Factor out the bidirectionally check in a (triggered) neighbour
>>>>>> detection mechanism
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (triggered HELLO message)
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 2) Remove the “validity time TLVs”, since they add complexity for no
>>>>>> perceivable benefits
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 3) Use the security model that we’ve discussed previously, where
>>>>>> (only) the metrics change per hop.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Since we’re discussing bi-directionality of links here, and the
>>>>>> necessity of a mechanism for handling these, I want to call attention to a
>>>>>> related issue, as I hinted previously.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The abstract states that the protocol:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>    ...is intended for use by mobile routers in wireless, multihop
>>>>>>
>>>>>>    networks.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Section 5 paragraph 4  of the document, however, reads:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>    Assuming link metrics are symmetric, the cost of the routes installed
>>>>>>
>>>>>>    in the Local Route Set at each router will be correct.  While this
>>>>>>
>>>>>>    assumption is not always correct, calculating incoming/outgoing
>>>>>>
>>>>>>    metric data is outside of scope of this document.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I do not know of *any* wireless systems, where the assumption that
>>>>>> “link metrics are symmetric” actually holds. Consequently, the conclusion
>>>>>> in the quoted paragraph:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>    calculating incoming/outgoing
>>>>>>
>>>>>>    metric data is outside of scope of this document.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Is not an acceptable design choice.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> While this protocol may not want to “calculate if for this link the
>>>>>> metrics is 4 or 5”, the protocol must be able to convey and distinguish
>>>>>> that “the metric from A to B is 4, and the metric from B to A is 19”.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This is a “related issue” since the solution may (as with the
>>>>>> bi-directionality check) be in the triggered neighbour detection mechanism:
>>>>>> that exchange could, if designed carefully, be used to probe for and convey
>>>>>> metrics information, also.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Hope this helps,
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Thomas
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 25 Apr 2016, at 15:27, Dearlove, Christopher (UK) <
>>>>>> [e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Assuming for the moment that everyone will need an RREP-Ack or won’t
>>>>>> (let’s come back to that) why do C and B need to put an address in as an
>>>>>> RREQ-Ack request? Why not a flag, because the address will be included as
>>>>>> the IP sending address - and we know 5444 is required to pass that on.
>>>>>> (It’s used by NHDP as well.) Then we don’t need to change the RREP, it will
>>>>>> have a flag set or not, and won’t change (in this regard).
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Now let’s consider do we know whether we can set a fixed flag. First
>>>>>> I’d say there are two cases - you’ve got a firm control on what’s going on
>>>>>> in your network, or it’s one of unknown parties and behaviour (consistent
>>>>>> with specification). In the former case you only want one setting, for
>>>>>> example no-Ack if running NHDP or your MAC layer tells you about
>>>>>> bidirectionality, Ack otherwise. In the latter case, I think you just
>>>>>> always want an Ack. So both cases get you to the same place.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Should that not be an acceptable argument (though I think it’s good
>>>>>> for where we are - in fact always Ack is close) then at flag is a step
>>>>>> better, it’s a fixed location to change. However it would be better in that
>>>>>> case if the two things to change (metric and ack flag) were together. But
>>>>>> that has its own issues, so I won’t go there.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *--*
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *Christopher Dearlove Senior Principal Engineer BAE Systems Applied
>>>>>> Intelligence Laboratories *
>>>>>> *__________________________________________________________________________
>>>>>> *
>>>>>> *T*:  [phone]  |  *E: *[e-mail]
>>>>>>
>>>>>> BAE Systems Applied Intelligence, Chelmsford Technology Park, Great
>>>>>> Baddow, Chelmsford, Essex CM2 8HN.
>>>>>> www.baesystems.com/ai
>>>>>>
>>>>>> BAE Systems Applied Intelligence Limited
>>>>>> Registered in England & Wales No: 01337451
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Registered Office: Surrey Research Park, Guildford, Surrey, GU2 7YP
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *From:* Victoria Mercieca [mailto:[e-mail]
>>>>>> <[e-mail]>]
>>>>>> *Sent:* 25 April 2016 14:15
>>>>>> *To:* Jiazi YI
>>>>>> *Cc:* Dearlove, Christopher (UK); Christopher Dearlove; Mobile Ad
>>>>>> Hoc Networks mailing list
>>>>>> *Subject:* Re: [manet] Message integrity and message mutability (was
>>>>>> RE: draft-ietf-manet-aodvv2-13 review - a couple of big ticket Items)
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> **** WARNING ****
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *This message originates from outside our organisation, either from
>>>>>> an external partner or the internet.*
>>>>>>
>>>>>> * Consider carefully whether you should click on any links, open any
>>>>>> attachments or reply. For information regarding **Red Flags** that
>>>>>> you can look out for in emails you receive, click here
>>>>>> <http://intranet.ent.baesystems.com/howwework/security/spotlights/Documents/Red%20Flags.pdf>.*
>>>>>> * If you feel the email is suspicious, please follow this process
>>>>>> <http://intranet.ent.baesystems.com/howwework/security/spotlights/Documents/Dealing%20With%20Suspicious%20Emails.pdf>.*
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Hi Jiazi,
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 1:04 PM, Jiazi YI <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Hi,
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 11:20 AM, Dearlove, Christopher (UK) <
>>>>>> [e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> With regard to your validity time point, we here have a tradeoff. If
>>>>>> you allow that feature, it significantly impacts on the approach that was
>>>>>> coming together on as best you can end to end encryption.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So the question is, is this a feature that’s really wanted?
>>>>>> Unfortunately I think we know that the answer to that is, we don’t know
>>>>>> because we don’t have any experience. My view would be that in the tradeoff
>>>>>> of an untested feature (unless I’m wrong about that) and the security
>>>>>> complication, security wins and drop the feature. If there is some real
>>>>>> requirement, then there’s a discussion. (Questions like how often the
>>>>>> intermediate routers actually have any knowledge - typically links break
>>>>>> for unexpected rather than expected reasons. Andan intermediate router
>>>>>> could possibly use a validity time to influence its behaviour.) Note that
>>>>>> dropping the ability of intermediate routers to modify/set still allows
>>>>>> validity times per route to be set at endpoints.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I agree with Chris' concern.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The ValidityTime is optional, which makes the integrity protection
>>>>>> hard. Furthermore, it gives a potential attack vector: as all the routers
>>>>>> in a path will take the shortest validityTime, a compromised router can set
>>>>>> the the validityTime to a very short value, which will make the route
>>>>>> installed along the path became invalid (very soon).
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On the other hand, I'm not sure this option will give us much help.
>>>>>> Chris mentioned much knowledge intermediate router would have to decide
>>>>>> this value (and how much sense the value would make).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Another issue is, a route to a destination might be updated by
>>>>>> different sources. For example, in the network below:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A----B-----C
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A first establish a route to B with long validity time. Then A
>>>>>> initiates a route discovery to C. C tends to set a short validity time,
>>>>>> which will make the route between B and A expire earlier than expected.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Is this a problem? Maybe yes, maybe no -- I'm not sure it's
>>>>>> considered or not.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Not sure I follow here.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Currently, the validity time of the route between A and B would not
>>>>>> affected by a short validity time of a route between A and C. Validity
>>>>>> times are per-route, and the route A-B and the route A-C are separate.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If we switched to a validity time per neighbor (so that we can keep
>>>>>> validity time separate from route advertisements) as I mentioned in the
>>>>>> email below, then the validity of a route between A and C would be affected
>>>>>> if there was a short validity time between A and B. But, if B will only
>>>>>> route for a certain amount of time, then the route between A and C will of
>>>>>> course be affected. Is it best to know in advance that there's a time
>>>>>> limit, or just deal with RERRs when they happen?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> With regard to the acknowledgements, the problem (with regard to
>>>>>> security) comes from trying to do two jobs with the same message - end to
>>>>>> end route advertisement and hop by hop acknowledgement. I understand the
>>>>>> reasons - saving bytes and message types. (I would have to study the
>>>>>> protocol really hard to identify if any message types can be folded
>>>>>> together and recognised by content rather than type efficiently. This I do
>>>>>> not expect to do.) Again a tradeoff. This one is in discussion space,
>>>>>> though that needs people who understand both sides of the issue, including
>>>>>> the details of the bidirectionality mechanism. Of course, as has been said,
>>>>>> we need one of those.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I haven't finished my review of the latest draft, and I don't get the
>>>>>> necessity of AckReq and the corresponding multicast RREP yet.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If possible, this "optional" field should be avoided.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> To give an overview of AckReq and RREP:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Since AODVv2 requires bidirectional links, this is the way to
>>>>>> determine if a link is bidirectional.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A----B----C
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 1) A sends RREQ, B forwards it, C receives the RREQ. B and C both
>>>>>> install a route to OrigAddr but they dont yet know if it's valid because
>>>>>> they dont know if the link to their next hop is available in the reverse
>>>>>> direction.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 2) C creates the RREP. Since it doesnt know if the link to B is
>>>>>> bidirectional, it includes the AckReq (an address to indicate that it
>>>>>> expects to receive a RREP_Ack from B).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 3) B receives the RREP, installs a route to TargAddr and marks it as
>>>>>> valid, since it knows the link to C is bidirectional, because the RREQ went
>>>>>> in one direction and the RREP came in the other. B also sends the RREP_Ack
>>>>>> to C and forwards the RREP to A (and might change the message to indicate
>>>>>> its own AckReq - ie that it requires an ack from A).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 4) C receives the RREP_Ack from B, and therefore knows that B
>>>>>> received the RREP, therefore the link is bidirectional. C can then mark its
>>>>>> route to OrigAddr as valid.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 5) Similarly, A receives the RREP, installs the route to TargAddr and
>>>>>> sends an RREP_Ack to B.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 6) B receives the RREP_Ack and marks its route to OrigAddr as valid.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Alternatively, in step 2, if C knows the link to B is bidirectional
>>>>>> (perhaps from some earlier route discovery), it doesnt need to put the
>>>>>> AckReq in the RREP. Then in step 3, since B doesnt know if the link to A is
>>>>>> bidirectional, it changes the message to add the AckReq address, in order
>>>>>> to get an RREP_Ack from A.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If we want to avoid changing the message, we'll need to look at
>>>>>> forwarding the RREP as-is, and creating a second message to solicit an
>>>>>> RREP_Ack, in order to verify that the link is bidirectional before marking
>>>>>> the route to OrigAddr as valid.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Kind regards,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Victoria.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> regards
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Jiazi
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *--*
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *Christopher Dearlove Senior Principal Engineer BAE Systems Applied
>>>>>> Intelligence Laboratories *
>>>>>> *__________________________________________________________________________
>>>>>> *
>>>>>> *T*:  [phone] <%2B44%20%280%291245%20242194>  |  *E: *
>>>>>> [e-mail]
>>>>>>
>>>>>> BAE Systems Applied Intelligence, Chelmsford Technology Park, Great
>>>>>> Baddow, Chelmsford, Essex CM2 8HN.
>>>>>> www.baesystems.com/ai
>>>>>>
>>>>>> BAE Systems Applied Intelligence Limited
>>>>>> Registered in England & Wales No: 01337451
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Registered Office: Surrey Research Park, Guildford, Surrey, GU2 7YP
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *From:* Victoria Mercieca [mailto:[e-mail]]
>>>>>> *Sent:* 23 April 2016 10:55
>>>>>> *To:* Christopher Dearlove
>>>>>> *Cc:* [e-mail]; Dearlove, Christopher (UK); Mobile Ad
>>>>>> Hoc Networks mailing list
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *Subject:* Re: [manet] Message integrity and message mutability (was
>>>>>> RE: draft-ietf-manet-aodvv2-13 review - a couple of big ticket Items)
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> **** WARNING ****
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *This message originates from outside our organisation, either from
>>>>>> an external partner or the internet. Consider carefully whether you should
>>>>>> click on any links, open any attachments or reply. For information
>>>>>> regarding **Red Flags*
>>>>>> * that you can look out for in emails you receive, click here
>>>>>> <http://intranet.ent.baesystems.com/howwework/security/spotlights/Documents/Red%20Flags.pdf>.
>>>>>> If you feel the email is suspicious, please follow this process
>>>>>> <http://intranet.ent.baesystems.com/howwework/security/spotlights/Documents/Dealing%20With%20Suspicious%20Emails.pdf>.*
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Hi Chris,
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> These have both been in the draft in some form since before I got
>>>>>> involved... but I'll do my best to explain.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> - For Validity Time, its a way to advertise that you would only
>>>>>> support the route contained in the message for a certain period of time.
>>>>>> The originator might use this, but the draft was written to allow any
>>>>>> intermediate node to be able to add it or update it too. The route created
>>>>>> in the Local Route Set has an expiration time associated with it, based on
>>>>>> the received validity time.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> - For the AckReq address, its so that you can add into a RREP a
>>>>>> request for an acknowledgement, so that you don't have to have a different
>>>>>> message type altogether for working out whether links to neighbors are
>>>>>> bidirectional, and also, since you only care about bidirectionality on
>>>>>> routes that are being set up, you dont need to constantly monitor all
>>>>>> neighbors.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In order to avoid the potential AckReq-related changes to each
>>>>>> message, maybe we do need to introduce a different message specifically for
>>>>>> this. We could maybe use RREP_Ack to both request and acknowledge? It means
>>>>>> an extra message of control traffic that needs to be sent, maybe one extra
>>>>>> message per hop on the path of a RREP, but it could still be limited to
>>>>>> neighbors which have participated in the route discovery rather than
>>>>>> monitoring all neighbors at all times.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This message could maybe also include "I'm happy to route anywhere
>>>>>> for a certain amount of time", sort of like willingness in OLSR/OLSRv2. So
>>>>>> instead of having a validity time per route, its a validity time per
>>>>>> neighbor. Then, for RREQ and RREP, only the metric value would change in
>>>>>> transit, as discussed. However, that leads to some issues with deciding
>>>>>> what a route's expiration time is. You might know how long the next hop
>>>>>> router is valid for, but what if a router beyond that, which was also part
>>>>>> of the route, had a lower validity time? You couldn't determine the real
>>>>>> validity time. Do we remove the route expiration time altogether to avoid
>>>>>> this issue? In which case, we would have to rely on RERR messages being
>>>>>> sent for routes which become invalid when the neighbor's validity time has
>>>>>> expired? So neighbor validity time expiration is treated the same as a link
>>>>>> break.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> What do you think?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Kind regards,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Victoria.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Sat, Apr 23, 2016 at 1:09 AM, Christopher Dearlove <
>>>>>> [e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Pretty much all of the discussion has been assuming only a metric
>>>>>> value change. With multiple things changing many of the ideas go out of the
>>>>>> window. That reinforces the point about not making specifications now that
>>>>>> might turn out to be wrong for ICVs.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Ignoring how this misunderstanding happened, I'll start by asking
>>>>>> why. Metric changing I understand. Why the other two? (there's a partial
>>>>>> explanation of one). What alternatives have people implemented in
>>>>>> comparable protocols?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> --
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Christopher Dearlove
>>>>>>
>>>>>> [e-mail] (iPhone)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> [e-mail] (home)
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 23 Apr 2016, at 00:26, Victoria Mercieca <[e-mail]>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Hi all,
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Continued in this thread because the other one seems to be more about
>>>>>> TLV types and metric type numbers, whereas this is about
>>>>>> regeneration/forwarding.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> To recap, in the current draft, there are 3 things that might change
>>>>>> at each hop:
>>>>>> - the metric value (happens in RREQ and RREP),
>>>>>> - adding/changing Validity Time using the Validity Time TLV (can
>>>>>> happen in RREQ and RREP),
>>>>>> - adding an address (and corresponding value in the AddressType TLV
>>>>>> to indicate how to interpret the address) to indicate the address from
>>>>>> which an RREP_Ack is expected, to accomplish the bidirectionality check
>>>>>> (can happen in RREP).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If we define a certain portion of the message as immutable and
>>>>>> include the ICV to verify that part, end to end:
>>>>>> - The metric value would be excluded from the ICV since it needs
>>>>>> changing at each hop.
>>>>>> - Would adding a Validity Time TLV at an intermediate hop be
>>>>>> acceptable? The whole TLV could be removed in order to calculate the ICV?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> - Would adding an address cause issues for the ICV, because it's in
>>>>>> the address block? Could the rule be "if it contains an AckReq address,
>>>>>> remove it (and the corresponding value in the AddressType TLV), before
>>>>>> checking the ICV", is that OK? Or would we need to avoid touching the
>>>>>> ICV'ed part of the message altogether, maybe put the AckReq address in a
>>>>>> separate Address Block, with an extra AddressType TLV following that
>>>>>> address block? Is there a way to accomplish this?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Also, to be thorough, do we need to consider RERR messages while we
>>>>>> discuss regeneration vs forwarding?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> - RERR (sent when a link breaks) is a way of saying "I've lost my
>>>>>> route so I'm telling others" and "you were my next hop, so now I've also
>>>>>> lost my route, I'll tell others", etc. It's going to be tailored at each
>>>>>> step to include the relevant routes that got deleted, it's not one message
>>>>>> being sent end-to-end like RREQ and RREP are.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> - However, RERR (sent when a source of traffic is sending data on a
>>>>>> route which comes through you, and you want to tell the Packet Source's
>>>>>> router to delete the route) could be seen as an end-to-end message which
>>>>>> all intermediate routers learn from, similar to RREQ and RREP. It reports
>>>>>> one route, and doesn't need changing at intermediate hops, so could be
>>>>>> protected with ICV.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> - Would it be OK to only require a message ICV if a PktSource address
>>>>>> was included, i.e. when the message needs to go via a number of
>>>>>> intermediate hops to PktSource's router? All other RERRs are intended to be
>>>>>> one-hop messages, which may in turn prompt other one-hop messages, etc...,
>>>>>> and a packet ICV might be more appropriate?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Kind regards,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Victoria.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Thu, Mar 17, 2016 at 5:26 PM, <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 17 Mar 2016, at 18:17, Dearlove, Christopher (UK) <
>>>>>> [e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Yes, I meant AODVv2, thanks for the catch.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So is your (Thomas) proposed base specification a hop count only
>>>>>> metric?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> No, the would be silly as base specification, given that hop count
>>>>>> mostly is useless.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> As base specification I would simply say “Include a Metric Type
>>>>>> Message TLV with a value field, and a 7182 Message TLV & Timestamp” as we
>>>>>> do in OLSRv2 (with the appropriate verbiage as to generation and
>>>>>> processing).
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> With the message generated by the originator of the RREQ/RREP and
>>>>>> *not* deconstructed/reconstructed/reordered (as is the risk with
>>>>>> “regeneration) allows knowing that it would be *only* that metric field
>>>>>> being modified (other than hop count/limit) for when eventually writing up
>>>>>> the extension.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (Actually doesn’t the current specification only define hop count, or
>>>>>> has that changed in latest draft?)
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> No. That is one of the issues I raise in my original. For some
>>>>>> reason, it cites RFC6551, which is a ROLL document and which has in its
>>>>>> abstract that:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>    Low-Power and Lossy Networks (LLNs) have unique characteristics
>>>>>>
>>>>>>    compared with traditional wired and ad hoc networks that require the
>>>>>>
>>>>>>    specification of new routing metrics and constraints.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I.e. this document cites a metric document which clearly claims to be
>>>>>> inapplicable in ad hoc networks. I note that this is another thing I’ve
>>>>>> raised for years without seeing it attempted resolved.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Best,
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Thomas
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *--*
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *Christopher Dearlove Senior Principal Engineer BAE Systems Applied
>>>>>> Intelligence Laboratories *
>>>>>> *__________________________________________________________________________
>>>>>> *
>>>>>> *T*:  [phone] <%2B44%20%280%291245%20242194>  |  *E: *
>>>>>> [e-mail]
>>>>>>
>>>>>> BAE Systems Applied Intelligence, Chelmsford Technology Park, Great
>>>>>> Baddow, Chelmsford, Essex CM2 8HN.
>>>>>> www.baesystems.com/ai
>>>>>>
>>>>>> BAE Systems Applied Intelligence Limited
>>>>>> Registered in England & Wales No: 01337451
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Registered Office: Surrey Research Park, Guildford, Surrey, GU2 7YP
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *From:* [e-mail] [mailto:[e-mail]
>>>>>> <[e-mail]>]
>>>>>> *Sent:* 17 March 2016 17:10
>>>>>> *To:* Dearlove, Christopher (UK)
>>>>>> *Cc:* Lotte Steenbrink; Mobile Ad Hoc Networks mailing list
>>>>>> *Subject:* Re: [manet] Message integrity and message mutability (was
>>>>>> RE: draft-ietf-manet-aodvv2-13 review - a couple of big ticket Items)
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> **** WARNING ****
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *This message originates from outside our organisation, either from
>>>>>> an external partner or the internet. Consider carefully whether you should
>>>>>> click on any links, open any attachments or reply. For information
>>>>>> regarding **Red Flags*
>>>>>> * that you can look out for in emails you receive, click here
>>>>>> <http://intranet.ent.baesystems.com/howwework/security/spotlights/Documents/Red%20Flags.pdf>.
>>>>>> If you feel the email is suspicious, please follow this process
>>>>>> <http://intranet.ent.baesystems.com/howwework/security/spotlights/Documents/Dealing%20With%20Suspicious%20Emails.pdf>.*
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 17 Mar 2016, at 18:04, Dearlove, Christopher (UK) <
>>>>>> [e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> OK, so we have a message that mutates by:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> - Modifying hop count/limit.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> - Modifying a metric value.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Anything else?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> As mutating (other than hop count/limit) messages aren’t covered by
>>>>>> 5444 or any derivative document (but only recommended against, not banned)
>>>>>> that you may need to make the message otherwise immutable (no
>>>>>> deconstruction and rebuilding, other than guaranteed unchanging) that would
>>>>>> have to be specified by AODVv2. (Easy to say, but needs saying.)
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> With you so far.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Then that information is not in a guaranteed fixed location given by
>>>>>> a simple offset. So any signature algorithm that finds it and ignores it or
>>>>>> aggregates on it is specific to OLSRv2.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Surely you mean AODVv2
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So standard 7182 ICVs don’t do the job, you would need an AODVv2
>>>>>> specialised variant. Which is the sort of thing that the message specific
>>>>>> TLV space is there for, I’d be strongly against a “but ignore the value of
>>>>>> this specific TLV should it occur” being in the general space. However it
>>>>>> can easily be defined by reference to 7182 (“this TLV is like that TLV,
>>>>>> except if an X TLV is present, set its value field to zero”).
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Messy, but could work.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Not that messy, actually, although clearly not as nice as “fixed
>>>>>> offset”.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That said, I am arguing for the base spec being:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>             “make the message otherwise immutable (no deconstruction
>>>>>> and rebuilding, other
>>>>>>
>>>>>>              than guaranteed unchanging)” which is afforded by
>>>>>> forwarding
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>                                     +
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>             RFC7182 Timestamps and ICVs.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>                                     +
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>             RFC7183 style text bringing it all together.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The “aggregated signatures around mutable field” would very be an
>>>>>> experimental extension.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> What I object to is, if the base spec specifically renders such
>>>>>> extensions impossible
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *--*
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *Christopher Dearlove Senior Principal Engineer BAE Systems Applied
>>>>>> Intelligence Laboratories *
>>>>>> *__________________________________________________________________________
>>>>>> *
>>>>>> *T*:  [phone] <%2B44%20%280%291245%20242194>  |  *E: *
>>>>>> [e-mail]
>>>>>>
>>>>>> BAE Systems Applied Intelligence, Chelmsford Technology Park, Great
>>>>>> Baddow, Chelmsford, Essex CM2 8HN.
>>>>>> www.baesystems.com/ai
>>>>>>
>>>>>> BAE Systems Applied Intelligence Limited
>>>>>> Registered in England & Wales No: 01337451
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Registered Office: Surrey Research Park, Guildford, Surrey, GU2 7YP
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *From:* Lotte Steenbrink [mailto:[e-mail]
>>>>>> <[e-mail]>]
>>>>>> *Sent:* 17 March 2016 16:48
>>>>>> *To:* Dearlove, Christopher (UK)
>>>>>> *Cc:* [e-mail]; Mobile Ad Hoc Networks mailing list
>>>>>> *Subject:* Re: [manet] Message integrity and message mutability (was
>>>>>> RE: draft-ietf-manet-aodvv2-13 review - a couple of big ticket Items)
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> **** WARNING ****
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *This message originates from outside our organisation, either from
>>>>>> an external partner or the internet. Consider carefully whether you should
>>>>>> click on any links, open any attachments or reply. For information
>>>>>> regarding **Red Flags*
>>>>>> * that you can look out for in emails you receive, click here
>>>>>> <http://intranet.ent.baesystems.com/howwework/security/spotlights/Documents/Red%20Flags.pdf>.
>>>>>> If you feel the email is suspicious, please follow this process
>>>>>> <http://intranet.ent.baesystems.com/howwework/security/spotlights/Documents/Dealing%20With%20Suspicious%20Emails.pdf>.*
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Hi all,
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Am 17.03.2016 um 17:44 schrieb Dearlove, Christopher (UK) <
>>>>>> [e-mail]>:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Good point about whether you just pass on one cost or a set of costs.
>>>>>> As I said, not looked at details - I will, when time permits. One cost is
>>>>>> much easier, and yes, it reduces the fixed size aggregated signatures
>>>>>> problem to “just” one of computational load.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> For the record, Thomas’ understanding is correct; the cost is one
>>>>>> aggregated value.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Best regards,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Lotte Steenrbink
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *--*
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *Christopher Dearlove Senior Principal Engineer BAE Systems Applied
>>>>>> Intelligence Laboratories *
>>>>>> *__________________________________________________________________________
>>>>>> *
>>>>>> *T*:  [phone] <%2B44%20%280%291245%20242194>  |  *E: *
>>>>>> [e-mail]
>>>>>>
>>>>>> BAE Systems Applied Intelligence, Chelmsford Technology Park, Great
>>>>>> Baddow, Chelmsford, Essex CM2 8HN.
>>>>>> www.baesystems.com/ai
>>>>>>
>>>>>> BAE Systems Applied Intelligence Limited
>>>>>> Registered in England & Wales No: 01337451
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Registered Office: Surrey Research Park, Guildford, Surrey, GU2 7YP
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *From:* [e-mail] [mailto:[e-mail]
>>>>>> <[e-mail]>]
>>>>>> *Sent:* 17 March 2016 16:38
>>>>>> *To:* Dearlove, Christopher (UK)
>>>>>> *Cc:* Mobile Ad Hoc Networks mailing list
>>>>>> *Subject:* Re: Message integrity and message mutability (was RE:
>>>>>> [manet] draft-ietf-manet-aodvv2-13 review - a couple of big ticket Items)
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> **** WARNING ****
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *This message originates from outside our organisation, either from
>>>>>> an external partner or the internet. Consider carefully whether you should
>>>>>> click on any links, open any attachments or reply. For information
>>>>>> regarding **Red Flags*
>>>>>> * that you can look out for in emails you receive, click here
>>>>>> <http://intranet.ent.baesystems.com/howwework/security/spotlights/Documents/Red%20Flags.pdf>.
>>>>>> If you feel the email is suspicious, please follow this process
>>>>>> <http://intranet.ent.baesystems.com/howwework/security/spotlights/Documents/Dealing%20With%20Suspicious%20Emails.pdf>.*
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 17 Mar 2016, at 17:30, Dearlove, Christopher (UK) <
>>>>>> [e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I appreciate Thomas’s comments about the limitations of message
>>>>>> regeneration, but I would be a bit less absolute.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The issues over end to end authentication and more advanced
>>>>>> signatures are valid. I need to read the given reference on aggregate
>>>>>> signatures to increase my knowledge (thanks for it), but my understanding
>>>>>> of the possibilities in this field may offer a solution to the problem, but
>>>>>> with some other issues (possibly including a new type of TLV).
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But the hop count/limit point I don’t fully agree with, you can
>>>>>> regenerate with an incremented/decremented count/limit, which leaves the
>>>>>> ability to prevent messages propagating indefinitely, including expanding
>>>>>> ring searches, and retains the ability to use RFC 5497 interval and
>>>>>> validity times that might be useful with an expanding ring search (or might
>>>>>> not).
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But the key issue is that AODVv2 wants to accumulate metrics. I still
>>>>>> haven’t got to the bottom of many details here, but let’s for the moment
>>>>>> just consider that conceptually.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It’s hard to handle end to end. Charlie’s draft attempts to do an end
>>>>>> to end of some information, not this information. I’m not sure if that’s
>>>>>> useful (and the specialised format is better avoided if possible). Other
>>>>>> approaches are hop by hop (might as well use packet signatures) and shared
>>>>>> key (might as well go hop by hop). Pairwise signatures for each pair of
>>>>>> routers I’m discounting as scaling terribly. In the interests of
>>>>>> completeness let’s mention not accumulating metrics, which puts us back to
>>>>>> hop count and that’s not ideal either.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I don’t think there is an ideal solution. (I like ideas I’ve seen
>>>>>> about aggregating, but that has some issues of its own, even apart from
>>>>>> computational load.) I’d love to be proved wrong - someone with the perfect
>>>>>> solution to come along.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Which means that either we make an arbitrary choice - which will be
>>>>>> disagreed with, but needs discussing first - or create something flexible.
>>>>>> Unfortunately flexible in that regard constrains in others, e.g. some
>>>>>> (many? most?) aggregating signatures need fixed data sizes (which we can do
>>>>>> by defining a TLV that “fills up” with hop count, but that has a cost too).
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I have been told by people much more well versed in this than I in
>>>>>> cryptology, that the correct answer is “some”.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That said, "AODVv2 wants to accumulate metrics” — does that mean that
>>>>>> the message grows as it is being forwarded, and that the recipient of a
>>>>>> RREQ/RREP will know the individual costs of each path segment? My
>>>>>> understanding is, that the recipient will get “the sum the costs of each
>>>>>> path segment” which should be fitting within a fixed size?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Thomas
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Sorry, no answers, just comments. And I’m not addressing Thomas’s
>>>>>> later points here.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *--*
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *Christopher Dearlove Senior Principal Engineer BAE Systems Applied
>>>>>> Intelligence Laboratories *
>>>>>> *__________________________________________________________________________
>>>>>> *
>>>>>> *T*:  [phone] <%2B44%20%280%291245%20242194>  |  *E: *
>>>>>> [e-mail]
>>>>>>
>>>>>> BAE Systems Applied Intelligence, Chelmsford Technology Park, Great
>>>>>> Baddow, Chelmsford, Essex CM2 8HN.
>>>>>> www.baesystems.com/ai
>>>>>>
>>>>>> BAE Systems Applied Intelligence Limited
>>>>>> Registered in England & Wales No: 01337451
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Registered Office: Surrey Research Park, Guildford, Surrey, GU2 7YP
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *From:* manet [mailto:[e-mail] <[e-mail]>
>>>>>> ] *On Behalf Of *[e-mail]
>>>>>> *Sent:* 17 March 2016 16:00
>>>>>> *To:* Mobile Ad Hoc Networks mailing list
>>>>>> *Subject:* [manet] draft-ietf-manet-aodvv2-13 review - a couple of
>>>>>> big ticket Items
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> **** WARNING ****
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *This message originates from outside our organisation, either from
>>>>>> an external partner or the internet. Consider carefully whether you should
>>>>>> click on any links, open any attachments or reply. For information
>>>>>> regarding **Red Flags*
>>>>>> * that you can look out for in emails you receive, click here
>>>>>> <http://intranet.ent.baesystems.com/howwework/security/spotlights/Documents/Red%20Flags.pdf>.
>>>>>> If you feel the email is suspicious, please follow this process
>>>>>> <http://intranet.ent.baesystems.com/howwework/security/spotlights/Documents/Dealing%20With%20Suspicious%20Emails.pdf>.*
>>>>>>
>>>>>> **** **WARNING ******
>>>>>> EXTERNAL EMAIL -- This message originates from outside our
>>>>>> organization.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Dear all,
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Apologies for not having gotten this done sooner - day-job leaving
>>>>>> few spare cycles.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I’ve previously offered reviews and comments, and some of those have
>>>>>> been addressed in the latest I-D — others have not, but should be. I recall
>>>>>> that there was some mail attempting to rebut parts of the review, and I
>>>>>> will dig it out and reply to that.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> With that being said, I have reviewed the latest version of the
>>>>>> document, and full details will be forthcoming. There’re a couple of
>>>>>> big-ticket/architectural items that I want to address up front, as I
>>>>>> believe that before we have those hammered out, it will be useless to go
>>>>>> into details. Note, I do not claim that this is an exhaustive list of “big
>>>>>> ticket items”, but that’s as far as I have gotten in thinking this through.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I also bring these up as they are items that have been brought up
>>>>>> repeatedly over the past years, but not resolved nor discussed.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *Loops*
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Just to bring this out: I share Chris’ worry about conflicting and
>>>>>> concurrent statements from the authors on “There are no loops possible” and
>>>>>> “We need to fix two situations where loops can occur” and “we are still
>>>>>> investigating some loop conditions”
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I particularly worry that this is not a discussion had in public, but
>>>>>> apparently in some other forum…
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *Intermediate Route Replies, and all of section 10*
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Section 10 contains a set of “vaguely specified extensions”, which is
>>>>>> incoherent with the intended status indicated for this document.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Specifically, and this is not unrelated to the point about loops
>>>>>> above, intermediate RREPs (section 10.3) are a potential source for loops.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Expanding Ring Multicast (section 10.1) is not documented in a way
>>>>>> that can be implemented (and also, see “Forwarding-vs-regeneration” below,
>>>>>> it is in the present form of this protocol impossible), etc.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *Forwarding-vs-regeneration*
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Recent exchanges on the list made me understand that protocol control
>>>>>> messages are *not* forwarded, but are consumed at each hop, then a new
>>>>>> message with (almost-but-not-quite) the same content is generated and
>>>>>> transmitted.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I have thought some more on this (& read some of the exchanges on the
>>>>>> list on this topic by Chris, Ulrich, and others), and I am convinced that
>>>>>> this is not the right way to go, *at least* for the following
>>>>>> reasons:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>             o          *It renders the hop-limit/hop-count fields in
>>>>>> the RFC5444 message header useless.*
>>>>>>
>>>>>>                         This would not be bad if the functionality
>>>>>> offered by those fields was not useful
>>>>>>
>>>>>>                         — sadly, it is. For example, for scope
>>>>>> limited flooding (expanding ring search, and
>>>>>>
>>>>>>                         such) which may be of interest, and which
>>>>>> require hop-limit.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>                         A hop-count field may also provide a “cheap”
>>>>>> (in terms of overhead) additional piece
>>>>>>
>>>>>>                         of information to use conjunctively with a
>>>>>> “real” metric.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>                         The only practical solution would be to
>>>>>> re-introduce these functions by way of inserting a
>>>>>>
>>>>>>                         MessageTLV — which (i) is not specified in
>>>>>> this document, and (ii) which would just
>>>>>>
>>>>>>                         serve to render messages bigger than strictly
>>>>>> needed.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>                         Scope limited flooding  does seem to be a
>>>>>> necessary requirement, if for no
>>>>>>
>>>>>>                         other reason than to prevent information from
>>>>>> “circulating forever in the network”.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>             o          *It makes end-to-end authentication
>>>>>> unnecessarily hard.*
>>>>>>
>>>>>>                         I think Chris called this out already, but it
>>>>>> bears repeating: S generates a message
>>>>>>
>>>>>>                         (say, a RREQ), and includes an ICV calculated
>>>>>> over the content of the message.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>                         For any recipient to be able to validate the
>>>>>> ICV, the message has to be exactly
>>>>>>
>>>>>>                         the same — not just in content, but in
>>>>>> structure — as what was generated.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>                         “Regenerating” rather than “forwarding”
>>>>>> messages means, that the intermediate
>>>>>>
>>>>>>                         router “regenerating” the RREQ may chose a
>>>>>> different structure (e.g., include TLVs
>>>>>>
>>>>>>                         in a different order).
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>                         The proposal from
>>>>>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-perkins-manet-aodv-e2esec-00
>>>>>>
>>>>>>                         is to add constraints on (i) the set of
>>>>>> elements to include in a signature and (ii) the
>>>>>>
>>>>>>                         order of these elements.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>                         One problem with that approach is (i): if an
>>>>>> extension adds a message TLV, or an
>>>>>>
>>>>>>                         Address TLV, to a message, then that will not
>>>>>> be “covered” by the proposed e2esec TLV.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>                         Rather for *each* extension developed, an
>>>>>> “updates e2esec” clause needs to be done.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>                         I’d say that this approach would be prone to
>>>>>> errors — and add entropy to the process
>>>>>>
>>>>>>                         of designing protocol extensions. The
>>>>>> alternative, a message being generated by the
>>>>>>
>>>>>>                         source and *forwarded* (as we do in OLSRv2,
>>>>>> for example) would allow ICV TLVs
>>>>>>
>>>>>>                         (even, allow reuse of those specified for
>>>>>> OLSRv2) for covering a message and
>>>>>>
>>>>>>                         extensions.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>                         “But what about the metrics value which will
>>>>>> change on each hop”, you may say?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>                         Fortunately, that is relatively easy to
>>>>>> handle: simply zero out the value of that TLV when
>>>>>>
>>>>>>                         generating or verifying the ICV MessageTLV.
>>>>>> And use Packet-TLVs for hop-by-hop
>>>>>>
>>>>>>                         authentication, if needed (but, see below).
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>             o          *It prevents the use of more clever/advanced
>>>>>> signature schemes/ICVs*
>>>>>>
>>>>>>                         Aggregate signature algorithms (
>>>>>> https://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/aggsurvey.pdf)
>>>>>>
>>>>>>                         exist, and an interesting use-case can be
>>>>>> found in also reactive protocols, allowing verifying
>>>>>>
>>>>>>                         not “just” the end points, but also the
>>>>>> intermediaries (again, with the appropriate “zero out”
>>>>>>
>>>>>>                         discussed above, or something smarter).
>>>>>>
>>>>>>                         Regeneration of messages, rather than
>>>>>> forwarding, renders that impossible (or, if used,
>>>>>>
>>>>>>                         updating to
>>>>>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-perkins-manet-aodv-e2esec-00)
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> There are other reasons, but the above are those that jump at me as
>>>>>> immediate show-stoppers.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I do honestly not see what possible benefit there is from
>>>>>> “regeneration” — but I see very clear inconveniences, and security is not
>>>>>> the least of these. Insisting on “regeneration” requires development of
>>>>>> “non-general workarounds” as pointed out above.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *Security Considerations*
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This is an always thorny subject. When OLSRv2 was going through the
>>>>>> process we got a thorough education in how little we knew about security
>>>>>> from the SEC-ADs, and had to spend about a year or so developing RFC7183.
>>>>>> The bottom line is, that this protocol needs its “RFC7183  equivalent”,
>>>>>> either as part of the main document, or as an independent document.
>>>>>> currently, that is not the case.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A minima, looking at BCP72 and BCP107 — taking inspiration from
>>>>>> RFC7183 might be aw good idea, as that was the most recent that went
>>>>>> through the SEC AD. Regardless of how, however, a “mandatory to implement”
>>>>>> security mechanism most be specified (I think the right term was “MUST
>>>>>> implement, SHOULD use”), in sufficient detail to ensure interoperable
>>>>>> implementations.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> As an example, both [RFC6130] and [RFC7181] set out that that:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>       On receiving a ... message, a router MUST first check if the
>>>>>>
>>>>>>       message is invalid for processing by this router
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> and then proceed to give a number of conditions that, each, will lead
>>>>>> to a rejection of the message as "badly formed and therefore invalid for
>>>>>> processing” — a list which RFC7183 then amended. That gave a “hook” for
>>>>>> RFC7183 for inserting “rejection”. Idem for message generation.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If I was to do RFC7181/RFC6130 today, I would include that directly
>>>>>> into the protocol specifications. It turned out to be more overhead (and
>>>>>> slow down publication anyways) to do it as separate documents.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Secondly, we need to be a lot more rigid in terms of what ICVs,
>>>>>> Timestamps, etc. are added/removed, and what that brings.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> For example (with the assumption that messages are *forwarded* and
>>>>>> *not* regenerated), this could be one option:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>                         o          When a RREQ, RREP message is
>>>>>> generated, add an ICV Message TLV, which is calculated <this way>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>                                      …(take inspiration from RFC7183
>>>>>> here)
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ...
>>>>>>
>>>>>> [Message clipped]
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>>>>>>
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>>>>>>
>>>>>>
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>>>>>>
>>>>>>
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>>>>>>
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>>>>>>
>>>>>>
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>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
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>>
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