Re: [martini] #56: GRUU mechanism security review

["martini issue tracker" <[e-mail]>]

#56: GRUU mechanism security review
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 Reporter:  rbarnes@…        |        Owner:  adam@…          
     Type:  defect           |       Status:  closed          
 Priority:  major            |    Milestone:  milestone1      
Component:  gin              |      Version:  1.0             
 Severity:  In WG Last Call  |   Resolution:  fixed           
 Keywords:                   |  
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Changes (by bernard_aboba@…):

  * status:  new => closed
  * resolution:  => fixed


Comment:

 I can't for the life of me work out what attack I thought I was
 preventing here. You are correct that being able to mint valid cookies
 would allow one PBX to send out GRUUs that routed to another PBX, but
 that's hardly a useful attack. It could just as easily hand out normal
 URIs in its contact that route to another PBX -- or, for that matter,
 GRUUs that it had received from another PBX. And, with GRUUs, even if it
 could mint its own ones that route elsewhere, they wouldn't pass the
 final validation step at the targeted PBX anyway.

 So I don't think there's anything there we need to worry about.

 That said, protecting I with an HMAC may still have some value --
 although I can't construct an attack based on being able to generate
 these somewhere other than the SSP.

 I propose removing 2 and 3, as they're not desirable (as far as I can
 tell).

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://wiki.tools.ietf.org/wg/martini/trac/ticket/56#comment:3>
martini <http://tools.ietf.org/martini/>