Re: [martini] #56: GRUU mechanism security review

"martini issue tracker" <trac@tools.ietf.org> Fri, 16 July 2010 22:15 UTC

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Subject: Re: [martini] #56: GRUU mechanism security review
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#56: GRUU mechanism security review
-----------------------------+----------------------------------------------
 Reporter:  rbarnes@…        |       Owner:            
     Type:  defect           |      Status:  new       
 Priority:  major            |   Milestone:  milestone1
Component:  gin              |     Version:  1.0       
 Severity:  In WG Last Call  |    Keywords:            
-----------------------------+----------------------------------------------

Comment(by adam@…):

 More from Richard:

 I guess the attack you can accomplish by sending messages to another PBX
 is a DoS, when SSP-capability > PBX-capability.  To that extent, it makes
 sense to have the HMAC on I.  The countervailing risk is that you could
 overwhelm the SSP server with HMAC computations by sending bogus HMACs,
 but HMACs are so cheap that seems unlikely -- it would get overwhelmed by
 the RSA decryptions first.  (Actually, that risk might be worth
 documenting in the Security Considerations; might want to rate-limit
 requests to temp-GRUUs.  No, I haven't looked to see if it's already
 there)

 I don't see any harm in removing 2 and 3, in any case.

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://wiki.tools.ietf.org/wg/martini/trac/ticket/56#comment:1>
martini <http://tools.ietf.org/martini/>