Re: [Mathmesh] A different approach to key escrow

Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com> Mon, 09 September 2019 15:09 UTC

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From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>
Date: Mon, 9 Sep 2019 11:09:10 -0400
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To: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
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Subject: Re: [Mathmesh] A different approach to key escrow
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On Sun, Sep 8, 2019 at 7:45 AM Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>;
wrote:

>
> I understand now. The master escrow key can be used to escrow both
> asymmetric
> private keys, but also to escrow session-level keys used for specific
> purposes (such as the disk encryption example)
>

Yes, sorry for the confusion. I am trying to unpack this all and make two
video presentations describing first what the Mesh is trying to do and
second the components used to do it.

The three big problems I see in Internet security are
1) Managing and credentialing the users keys across their many devices.
2) Managing and accepting contact information including public keys of
other users and services
3) Securing data at rest.

The mechanism required to address any one of these by itself is only
slightly less than the mechanism required to solve all three