Re: [MEXT] [!! SPAM] Re: Well-known problem with authentication/etc. in wirelessnetworks

"Charles E. Perkins" <charliep@computer.org> Fri, 26 August 2011 18:37 UTC

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Subject: Re: [MEXT] [!! SPAM] Re: Well-known problem with authentication/etc. in wirelessnetworks
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Hello Pete,

I might be stepping out on another limb here, but
anyway...

On 8/25/2011 7:23 PM, Pete McCann wrote:

> You're right that performance is probably not why 3GPP went the
> way they did. ...

Check.

> There was also a legacy authentication infrastructure built around
> AKA that they wanted to re-use.  They didn't build algorithm agility
> into their UE authentication protocol.  One could argue that in an
> LTE network the mobility is very much tied to the access authentication,
> and it's one reason why MIPv6 has missed the boat here.

Double check.


>> Thus I am still not sure what the problem is.


The problem is that they can't do very effective handovers.
Worse, they are designing _per-application_ handover systems.
This is wrong by most reasonable engineering standards,
regardless on the positive effect it might have for
standards junkies and permanent employment for engineers.


> There's probably very little impetus for change no matter what MEXT
> does.


I agree that, if [mext] does nothing,
there won't be much impetus for change.
But if we do something that is (a) secure,
(b) deployable, (c) easier to administer,
and (d) considerably better performance,
then I reckon they'd have to be purposefully
resistant to insist on ignoring it.

Regards,
Charlie P.