Re: [mile] AD review of draft-ietf-mile-xmpp-grid-08

["Nancy Cam-Winget (ncamwing)" <[e-mail]>]

Hi Alexey,
Thank you for your careful review (and Happy Holidays!).  Please see comments below (and the updates have been made to now version -09 draft
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-mile-xmpp-grid/):


On 12/6/18, 04:21, "mile on behalf of Alexey Melnikov" <[e-mail] on behalf of [e-mail]> wrote:

    Hi,
    
    This document reads well and I am grateful for the extensive Security 
    Considerations section!
    
    Some specific comments, most of which are nits/minor things:
    
    The following references need to be Normative, as they describe 
    documents that need to be read and understood in order to implement 
    various requirements specified in this draft:
    
      [XEP-0060]
    
      [XEP-0030] (used in a SHOULD)
    
      [XEP-0004] (used in a SHOULD)
[NCW] Updated in version -09
    
    
    The following need to have References:
    
    SASL EXTERNAL - Normative reference to RFC 4422
    
    DHCP - Informative reference
[NCW] Updated in version -09
    
    
    8.2.1.  Network Attacks
    
        A variety of attacks can be mounted using the network.  For the
        purposes of this subsection the phrase "network traffic" can be taken
        to mean messages and/or parts of messages.  Any of these attacks can
        be mounted by network elements, by parties who control network
        elements, and (in many cases) by parties who control network-attached
        devices.
    
        o  Network traffic can be passively monitored to glean information
           from any unencrypted traffic
    
      [snip]
    
        o  A "Man In The Middle" (MITM) attack can be mounted where an
           attacker interposes itself between two communicating parties and
           poses as the other end to either party or impersonates the other
           end to either or both parties
    
        o  Resist attacks (including denial of service and other attacks from
           XMPP-Grid Platforms)
    
    This seems out of place or not worded quite right. All other items 
    describe various attacks. What exactly does this item mean?
[NCW] It was meant to be a general statement that other attacks could be there, but as you note,
It seemed out of place and didn't really add to the considerations so I've removed it.
    
        o  Undesired network traffic can be sent in an effort to overload an
           architectural component, thus mounting a denial of service attack
    
    
    8.3.6.  Securing the Certification Authority
    
        As noted above, compromise of a Certification Authority (CA) trusted
        to issue certificates for the XMPP-Grid Controller and/or XMPP-Grid
        Platforms is a major security breach.  Many guidelines for proper CA
        security have been developed: the CA/Browser Forum's Baseline
        Requirements, the AICPA/CICA Trust Service Principles, etc. The CA
        operator and relying parties should agree on an appropriately
        rigorous security practices to be used.
    
        Even with the most rigorous security practices, a CA can be
        compromised.
    
    I think it might be good to reference Certificate Transparency WG work 
    here (informatively), see <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/trans/documents/
[NCW] As I was trying to figure out how to work it in, I added a reference to RFC6962
(the base draft from the trans WG) as another guideline....hopefully that satisfies your request?
    
    Best Regards,
    
    Alexey
    
    
    
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