[mile] AD review of draft-ietf-mile-xmpp-grid-08

[Alexey Melnikov <[e-mail]>]

Hi,

This document reads well and I am grateful for the extensive Security 
Considerations section!

Some specific comments, most of which are nits/minor things:

The following references need to be Normative, as they describe 
documents that need to be read and understood in order to implement 
various requirements specified in this draft:

  [XEP-0060]

  [XEP-0030] (used in a SHOULD)

  [XEP-0004] (used in a SHOULD)


The following need to have References:

SASL EXTERNAL - Normative reference to RFC 4422

DHCP - Informative reference


8.2.1.  Network Attacks

    A variety of attacks can be mounted using the network.  For the
    purposes of this subsection the phrase "network traffic" can be taken
    to mean messages and/or parts of messages.  Any of these attacks can
    be mounted by network elements, by parties who control network
    elements, and (in many cases) by parties who control network-attached
    devices.

    o  Network traffic can be passively monitored to glean information
       from any unencrypted traffic

  [snip]

    o  A "Man In The Middle" (MITM) attack can be mounted where an
       attacker interposes itself between two communicating parties and
       poses as the other end to either party or impersonates the other
       end to either or both parties

    o  Resist attacks (including denial of service and other attacks from
       XMPP-Grid Platforms)

This seems out of place or not worded quite right. All other items 
describe various attacks. What exactly does this item mean?

    o  Undesired network traffic can be sent in an effort to overload an
       architectural component, thus mounting a denial of service attack


8.3.6.  Securing the Certification Authority

    As noted above, compromise of a Certification Authority (CA) trusted
    to issue certificates for the XMPP-Grid Controller and/or XMPP-Grid
    Platforms is a major security breach.  Many guidelines for proper CA
    security have been developed: the CA/Browser Forum's Baseline
    Requirements, the AICPA/CICA Trust Service Principles, etc. The CA
    operator and relying parties should agree on an appropriately
    rigorous security practices to be used.

    Even with the most rigorous security practices, a CA can be
    compromised.

I think it might be good to reference Certificate Transparency WG work 
here (informatively), see <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/trans/documents/>

Best Regards,

Alexey