Re: [MLS] Use Cases for avoiding Forward Secrecy

"Katriel Cohn-Gordon" <me@katriel.co.uk> Fri, 02 March 2018 10:08 UTC

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From: "Katriel Cohn-Gordon" <me@katriel.co.uk>
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Date: Fri, 02 Mar 2018 10:08:25 +0000
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Subject: Re: [MLS] Use Cases for avoiding Forward Secrecy
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On Fri, 2 Mar 2018, at 9:51 AM, Dave Cridland wrote:
> Sure, but that explicitly means that messages within the archive can
> no longer be authenticated, doesn't it?

Do e.g. governments require that the archive consist of the actual encrypted messages that were transmitted over the wire? As opposed to having a trusted party, perhaps a "recorder" group member, re-encrypt them for archival.