Re: [MLS] Message Protection
Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> Thu, 28 June 2018 14:38 UTC
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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Date: Thu, 28 Jun 2018 10:38:28 -0400
Cc: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>, mls@ietf.org
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References: <CAL02cgREuhjySYZXmhaE3RuF3fZ5iwCgyW2ChtgwPYhDgdaYUQ@mail.gmail.com> <11392542-5C22-4033-99F6-009F066F48DD@vigilsec.com> <CABkgnnVZMNhrSE0mL7-yehuoR-uE-Kj3zZC9nqRY4zHE2gmVPg@mail.gmail.com>
To: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [MLS] Message Protection
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Martin:
Each sender using a separate key seems pretty easy. The key can be derived using the sender's position in the key or any other unique identifier that comes natural in the messaging protocol.
Russ
> On Jun 27, 2018, at 6:12 PM, Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> I was thinking that the nonce generation aspect would be worth looking
> into as well. If you crib from the TLS design, maybe you could have
> per-participant keys so that each can be independently responsible for
> ensuring nonce-uniqueness. Then they can use counters to avoid nonce
> reuse if they so choose. Otherwise, I was tempted to suggest AES-SIV
> or another nonce-reuse-resistant scheme, but there are fewer of those
> available than straight up AEADs.
> On Thu, Jun 28, 2018 at 7:36 AM Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>> On Jun 26, 2018, at 8:38 PM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:
>>>
>>> Hey all,
>>>
>>> One of the things we kind of waved our hands about in the charter and current protocol draft is message protection. That is, the idea of specifying a concrete syntax for using the keys we negotiate using MLS to actually protect content.
>>>
>>> This is a simpler problem than key exchange (since you've already established a group key), but it still has some nuances that matter to the overall security story, so it seems worth writing some things down:
>>>
>>> - Content encapsulation (e.g., what nonces / AAD you use with AEAD)
>>> - Key schedule, i.e., how message keys are derived from the group key
>>> - ACK / NACK / replay
>>> - Transcript integrity (?)
>>> - Expiration times (?)
>>>
>>> What's missing here?
>>
>> If the tree produces a key and an identifier for that key, then the protocol is straightforward.
>>
>> The key identifier could be derived from the key itself so that anyone that knows the key also knows the identifier.
>>
>> prk = HKDF-Extract('mls-key-id' | tree-identifier, key)
>>
>> keyid = HKDF-Expand(prk, '', sizeof(keyid))
>>
>> Russ
>>
>> _______________________________________________
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- [MLS] Message Protection Richard Barnes
- Re: [MLS] Message Protection Benjamin Beurdouche
- Re: [MLS] Message Protection Russ Housley
- Re: [MLS] Message Protection Martin Thomson
- Re: [MLS] Message Protection Richard Barnes
- Re: [MLS] Message Protection Russ Housley
- Re: [MLS] Message Protection Katriel Cohn-Gordon
- Re: [MLS] Message Protection Martin Thomson
- Re: [MLS] Message Protection Alexey Ermishkin
- Re: [MLS] Message Protection Martin Thomson
- Re: [MLS] Message Protection Alexey Ermishkin