Re: [MLS] Re-randomized TreeKEM

Joel Alwen <jalwen@wickr.com> Thu, 24 October 2019 20:19 UTC

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To: Raphael Robert <raphael@wire.com>, Benjamin Beurdouche <benjamin.beurdouche@inria.fr>
Cc: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>, Karthikeyan Bhargavan <karthik.bhargavan@gmail.com>, Messaging Layer Security WG <mls@ietf.org>, Yevgeniy Dodis <dodis@cs.nyu.edu>
References: <CAL02cgSykPGZhaS26MuR78XBS9OVfBzGYVEzcRRROqbP-P-t6A@mail.gmail.com> <3B5BE109-6C78-474F-A0E5-138DE6931CF6@inria.fr> <6E36D92F-E700-4B57-9784-CFD366ECA912@wire.com>
From: Joel Alwen <jalwen@wickr.com>
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Date: Thu, 24 Oct 2019 22:19:29 +0200
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Subject: Re: [MLS] Re-randomized TreeKEM
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On 24/10/2019 12:09, Raphael Robert wrote:
> This means that vendors/implementors have to implement something at a new layer that is somewhere in between the crypto library and the protocol layer.

Yeah, thats a good point. To me, proposing a reasonable way to build UPKE on top of, say, libsodium is one of the main
things I want to figure out right now (along with better understanding of how Mult() for X25519 can fail). Basically,
this means implementing Mult() from, say, libsodium as going from Mult() -> multiplicative UPKE should be very
straightforward using what I'd expect even the most basic interface for any X25519 implementation to provide. I guess
the challenge here is going to be that both clamp() and the composite order are neither exported nor directly accessible
in libsodium?

In any case, if Mult() needs implementing from scratch then some of the risks I see here are:
- Side-Channels: Mult() operates on secret keys so really it should be implemented with side-channel free code (e.g.
constant time, memory access, etc.). We could mitigate this by proposing a specific implementation similar to whats done
in RFC 7748.
- Memory management: Secret keys being exported out of an X25519 library need to be handled safely in memory (e.g. 0-ed
out before free, don't swap to disk, etc.) Libsodium does provide some memory-management functions for this very purpose.
- Good Entropy: The re-randomizer d' needs to be sampled uniformly and independently. (Again I think most crypto
libraries provide functions to do this.)

Probably a naïve attempt at such a list of risks & mitigations. But making this stuff explicit seems useful for later on
if we put this into the MLS RFCs (not to mention for a separate addendum RFC for 7748 describing the key-rerandomization
technique on its own). So any input on the expected risks (and possible mitigations) would be very appreciated!


On 24/10/2019 12:09, Raphael Robert wrote:
> Finally I also understand that because of the clamping the actual security level of DH operations with curve 25519 is
> not as clearly understood as it is the case with X25519 now.

Not sure I follow what you mean here. One the one hand the UPKE construction is built on top of the X25519 (or X448)
group not just Curve25519. In particular, Mult() uses the same point representation, clamping of scalars and scalar
multiplication as specified in RFC 7748.

On the other hand, if anything, I'd have thought questions about exact bit security are the other way round. It's X25519
that does the clamping so that's where the question about exact bit security would arise no? Clamping isn't inherent to
Curve25519 though; rather its just one way to do scalar multiplication mapping into a prime order sub-group based on the
composite order Curve25519 group. But, as shown by Ristretto, other methods are possible that completely avoid clamping
(and also happen to be both additively and multiplicatively homomorphic). In particular, I believe CDH, DDH and all the
other usual crypto hardness assumptions are equivalent for Curve25519's prime order subgroup and for the Ristretto
group. Not sure thats true for X25519 though.

In any case, I'm no expert on this stuff so feel free to correct me if I'm wrong. :-)

- Joël