Re: [MLS] MLSPlaintext packets aren't authenticated using symmetric key schedule

Joel Alwen <jalwen@wickr.com> Tue, 18 August 2020 17:30 UTC

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To: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>, Raphael Robert <raphael@wire.com>
Cc: Messaging Layer Security WG <mls@ietf.org>
References: <7d7283b6-8c70-d045-81c2-f552219869ad@wickr.com> <F5B1E029-D8B4-4BEA-BF7A-CDD531D662BD@wire.com> <CAL02cgRTtZp+gHKA0hXxxEn_L6SWRRTJa-U+bhQUhpvM8qZ+Cg@mail.gmail.com> <87d72ad5-dce9-18f7-f1c4-7a8317fd0739@wickr.com> <30DD617C-A8A8-4801-A62A-43A722B1B597@wire.com> <CAL02cgTo8CXNt26XKGrMo1vU-n6M88YtoJ4cqdxrvpyWaX1VNA@mail.gmail.com>
From: Joel Alwen <jalwen@wickr.com>
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Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2020 19:30:22 +0200
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Subject: Re: [MLS] MLSPlaintext packets aren't authenticated using symmetric key schedule
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> Joël, do you want to write a PR?  If not, I could probably get to it in the
> next couple days.

Thanks. :-) If you could that would be really nice.

- Joël

On 18/08/2020 19:20, Richard Barnes wrote:
> Sounds like we're converging here.  The only question in my mind is what goes in
> the MAC -- seems like the easy option is probably "the remainder of the
> MLSPlaintextTBS", i.e., everything from group_id to the end.  That seems like it
> minimizes multiple serialization:
> 
> tbs_content = serialize(group_id, ...)
> membership_token = KDF.Extract(confirmation_key, tbs_content)
> tbs = group_context || membership_token || tbs_content
> 
> So the PR would be to basically pop the context off of MLSPlaintextTBS and add
> the three lines above (with the switch for internal/external in prose).
> 
> Joël, do you want to write a PR?  If not, I could probably get to it in the next
> couple days.
> 
> --Richard
> 
> On Tue, Aug 18, 2020 at 12:24 PM Raphael Robert <raphael@wire.com
> <mailto:raphael@wire.com>> wrote:
> 
>     I think what you just described is indeed a combination of option 1 & 2.
>     It’s a MAC over the payload we want to authenticate, but it’s implicit and
>     we only include it in the MLSPlaintextTBS. Or in other words, we stripped it
>     from MLSPlaintext because it is implicitly known to any valid member of the
>     group.
> 
>     Raphael
> 
>>     On 18 Aug 2020, at 18:16, Joel Alwen <jalwen@wickr.com
>>     <mailto:jalwen@wickr.com>> wrote:
>>
>>     Yeah, I like Option 2 here. I like that it avoids growing packet size.
>>
>>     One caveat though: I'd go for the MAC(...) version rather than the
>>     confirmation_key. For starters thing including confirmation_key doesnt
>>     authenticate the contents of the packet. But even if it did, signatures aren't
>>     meant to hide the contents of what was signed. (Amend you favorite sig
>>     scheme to
>>     tack on the message at the end a signature and you've still got a secure
>>     signature scheme. But clearly not a message hiding one.) That means that AFAIK
>>     neither ECDSA nor EdDSA etc. were designed or analyzed for such a property. So
>>     this would amount to a very non-standard use of a signature schemes by
>>     MLS. Not
>>     saying it doesn't work for the particular sig schemes in our ciphersuite. But
>>     its def. not how signatures are "meant" to be used.
>>
>>     But that leaves Option 2 with, say, including tag = MAC(conf_key,
>>     conf_trans_hash || MLSPlaintext.content) into whats being signed which I like
>>     and think gets the job done. Both conf_* values are taken from the current
>>     epoch. By MLSPlaintext.content I mean whats now called MLSPlaintextTBS.
>>
>>>     I would propose that we do need something additional on Commit messages as
>>>     well as Proposals.
>>
>>     @Richard: For Proopsals I think this works. Is that about what you had in mind
>>     for commits too?
>>
>>     - Joël
>>
>>
>>     On 18/08/2020 17:26, Richard Barnes wrote:
>>>     Thanks for pointing this out, Joël.  I agree that the attacks you're
>>>     describing
>>>     should work as things are currently specified.  And they're salient,
>>>     especially
>>>     the "replace Alice in the group" one.
>>>
>>>     Also agree with Raphael is correct that Commit is not affected by this, since
>>>     someone who is not a member won't be able to generate the right confirmation
>>>     value.  However, I don't think this is actually the right design to adopt
>>>     for a
>>>     general solution to this problem.  Confirmation verifies group membership
>>>     *after* processing the handshake message; the point here is that we
>>>     should also
>>>     have a membership check *before* processing handshake messages.  In
>>>     particular,
>>>     I would propose that we do need something additional on Commit messages
>>>     as well
>>>     as Proposals.
>>>
>>>     Thinking about solutions here, a couple of options come to mind:
>>>
>>>     1. Use MLSCiphertext, but with an integrity-only encapsulation
>>>     2. Incorporate in the signature something that is only known to the group
>>>     (e.g.,
>>>     confirmation_key or MAC(confirmation_key; confirmed_transcript_hash ||
>>>     Proposal/Commit))
>>>
>>>     Option (1) has the appeal that you would only ever send MLSCiphertext, though
>>>     switching between encrypted/not could be problematic.  Option (2) seems a lot
>>>     more appealing: It doesn't add any overhead, since the group-secret value
>>>     doesn't need to be sent.  And we already switch between the signature context
>>>     that is added for group members vs. external.  In fact, I think option
>>>     (2) would
>>>     just amount to a one-line change to include an extra, secret value in the
>>>     context at the top of the MLSPlaintextTBS struct.
>>>     https://github.com/mlswg/mls-protocol/blob/master/draft-ietf-mls-protocol.md#content-signing-and-encryption
>>>
>>>     The only thing that seems odd about (2) is overloading signature
>>>     verification in
>>>     that way, i.e., using the ability to generate a signature over a secret
>>>     thing to
>>>     prove you know the secret thing.  That doesn't seem obviously flawed to
>>>     me, but
>>>     worth thinking about.
>>>
>>>     Does that make sense to folks?
>>>
>>>     --Richard
>>>
>>>
>>>     On Tue, Aug 18, 2020 at 10:55 AM Raphael Robert
>>>     <raphael=40wire.com@dmarc.ietf.org
>>>     <mailto:raphael=40wire.com@dmarc.ietf.org> <mailto:40wire.com@dmarc.ietf.org>>
>>>     wrote:
>>>
>>>        Hi Joel,
>>>
>>>        For context: this would only apply when applications use cleartext
>>>        MLSPlaintext for HS messages. The recommendation is still to encrypt them
>>>        and send them around as MLSCiphertext.
>>>        That being said, we said we would like to support scenarios where HS
>>>        messages are not necessarily encrypted.
>>>
>>>        Question: would this attack work with Commit messages? I’m thinking that
>>>        they would be rejected because the attacker cannot compute the
>>>     confirmation_tag.
>>>
>>>        As you mention in the PS, the easy target would be Proposal messages.
>>>
>>>        I’d be interested to see what exactly you would propose as a mitigation
>>>        mechanism.
>>>
>>>        Raphael
>>>
>>>>     On 18 Aug 2020, at 16:36, Joel Alwen <jalwen@wickr.com
>>>>     <mailto:jalwen@wickr.com>
>>>        <mailto:jalwen@wickr.com>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>     Hey everyone,
>>>>
>>>>     Something thats been bugging Marta Mularczyk and Daniel Jost and me for
>>>>     a bit
>>>>     now is that handshake messages sent out as MLSPlaintext packets are only
>>>>     authenticated using signatures, but not using the group's key schedule. For
>>>>     non-members that makes sense but for group members that's weaker than
>>>>     need be.
>>>>
>>>>     Suppose Alice is in a group using signing key pair (spk, ssk). I corrupt
>>>        her to
>>>>     learn ssk. Now I loose access to her device again. Later she generates a
>>>>     fresh
>>>>     key package with her same spk but a new HPKE key for her leaf. She sends
>>>        out and
>>>>     update proposal for her new key package and someone commits to the update.
>>>>
>>>>     Expected result: she (and the group at large) has achieved PCS again.
>>>>
>>>>     Actual result: using her stolen ssk I can still forge a new proposal's
>>>        (sent as
>>>>     MLSPlaintext packets) coming from Alice. Some things I could do with this
>>>        power:
>>>>     - I can generate a new key package kp for Alice using her spk and some
>>>        HPKE key
>>>>     she doesn't know. Then I forge an update proposal for Alice with kp. If it
>>>        gets
>>>>     committed I've effectively kicked her out of the group.
>>>>     - I could forge Add's and Remove's coming from Alice, so I could trick the
>>>>     group into thinking Alice is trying to Add my account to the group or remove
>>>>     some other group member.
>>>>
>>>>     Lemme know if I've missed something here in that scenario...
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>     If I didn't miss anything and the attacks really work as advertised then IMO
>>>>     this is kinda weak sauce and worth avoiding if possible. So to that end, how
>>>>     about we modify MLS such that MLSPlaintext packets coming from group members
>>>>     must also be authenticated using something from the application key
>>>>     schedule.
>>>>     Now the above attacks fail. As soon as Alice's update is gets committed I no
>>>>     longer know the group's key schedule and so can't forged packet from
>>>        Alice. More
>>>>     generally, this brings the PCS guarantees when using MLSPlaintexts
>>>>     frameing in
>>>>     line with what we're getting from MLSCiphertext packets.
>>>>
>>>>     Any thoughts?
>>>>
>>>>     - Joël
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>     PS. For concreteness, we could probably extend the current mechanism for
>>>        getting
>>>>     concistancy (the confirmation_tag) to also provide symmetric key
>>>        authentication.
>>>>     E.g. include most of the MLSPlaintext content into whats being tagged by
>>>>     confirmation_tag. That would cover the case of a commit packet and doesn't
>>>        even
>>>>     grow the size of MLSPlaintext packets over the current design.
>>>>
>>>>     For a proposal packet we could also have a confirmation_tag but this one is
>>>>     computed using the *current* epoch's confirmation_key and
>>>        confirmed_transcript_hash.
>>>>
>>>>     _______________________________________________
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>>>
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