Re: [MLS] Use Cases for avoiding Forward Secrecy
Dave Cridland <dave@cridland.net> Fri, 02 March 2018 21:18 UTC
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From: Dave Cridland <dave@cridland.net>
Date: Fri, 2 Mar 2018 21:18:28 +0000
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To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
Cc: Nadim Kobeissi <nadim@symbolic.software>, mls@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [MLS] Use Cases for avoiding Forward Secrecy
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On 2 March 2018 at 21:04, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote: > > Hiya, > > On 02/03/18 20:27, Dave Cridland wrote: >> To be absolutely clear, I'm not a big fan of SAKKE and I think it's >> entirely unsuitable for the consumer in any form. Consumers generally >> benefit from FS, and SAKKE's mandatory escrow is just plain wrong in >> that setting. > > I agree with you about mikke-sakke and mandatory key escrow in general. > (As does the IETF, in RFC 1984/BCP 200.) > > As a non-nit: I'd much prefer we consider people and not "consumers," > but no need to go there as part of this thread - I know what you meant > when saying "consumer" above and it's ok in context. I'm using that term quite deliberately, I'm afraid. "Consumers" are not the same as "People" - People act in roles, and one such role is as a consumer. Happy to use whatever terms you like, but not conflicting ones. "People", in general, might find a legally recognisable record of their communications quite useful at times. > However, I do hope > work on MLS does not assume the existence of a major "mothership" - if > it did, then that'd be bad IMO, regardless of whether a mothership is > an employer, government or commercial service provider. (Allowing for > the existence of such entities is ok IMO, requiring them is not.) > Right, totally agree. I think it's relatively simple to ensure that a person cannot have a "mothership", as you put it, imposed upon them without their knowledge, and I think that's an entirely sane goal. (In fact, I think it's met by the current drafts, which is why I'm not arguing for it). Dave.
- [MLS] Use Cases for avoiding Forward Secrecy Dave Cridland
- Re: [MLS] Use Cases for avoiding Forward Secrecy Raphael Robert
- Re: [MLS] Use Cases for avoiding Forward Secrecy Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [MLS] Use Cases for avoiding Forward Secrecy Stephen Farrell
- Re: [MLS] Use Cases for avoiding Forward Secrecy Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [MLS] Use Cases for avoiding Forward Secrecy Dennis Jackson
- Re: [MLS] Use Cases for avoiding Forward Secrecy Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [MLS] Use Cases for avoiding Forward Secrecy Dave Cridland
- Re: [MLS] Use Cases for avoiding Forward Secrecy Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [MLS] Use Cases for avoiding Forward Secrecy Eric Rescorla
- Re: [MLS] Use Cases for avoiding Forward Secrecy Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [MLS] Use Cases for avoiding Forward Secrecy Dennis Jackson
- Re: [MLS] Use Cases for avoiding Forward Secrecy Jon Millican
- Re: [MLS] Use Cases for avoiding Forward Secrecy Stephen Farrell
- Re: [MLS] Use Cases for avoiding Forward Secrecy Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [MLS] Use Cases for avoiding Forward Secrecy Richard Barnes
- Re: [MLS] Use Cases for avoiding Forward Secrecy Dave Cridland
- Re: [MLS] Use Cases for avoiding Forward Secrecy Dave Cridland
- Re: [MLS] Use Cases for avoiding Forward Secrecy Russ Housley
- Re: [MLS] Use Cases for avoiding Forward Secrecy Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [MLS] Use Cases for avoiding Forward Secrecy Jon Millican
- Re: [MLS] Use Cases for avoiding Forward Secrecy Sean Turner
- Re: [MLS] Use Cases for avoiding Forward Secrecy Dave Cridland
- Re: [MLS] Use Cases for avoiding Forward Secrecy Dave Cridland
- Re: [MLS] Use Cases for avoiding Forward Secrecy Katriel Cohn-Gordon
- Re: [MLS] Use Cases for avoiding Forward Secrecy Dave Cridland
- Re: [MLS] Use Cases for avoiding Forward Secrecy Eric Rescorla
- Re: [MLS] Use Cases for avoiding Forward Secrecy Nadim Kobeissi
- Re: [MLS] Use Cases for avoiding Forward Secrecy Dave Cridland
- Re: [MLS] Use Cases for avoiding Forward Secrecy Stephen Farrell
- Re: [MLS] Use Cases for avoiding Forward Secrecy Dave Cridland
- Re: [MLS] Use Cases for avoiding Forward Secrecy Nadim Kobeissi
- Re: [MLS] Use Cases for avoiding Forward Secrecy Phillip Hallam-Baker