Re: [MLS] Re-randomized TreeKEM

[Karthikeyan Bhargavan <[e-mail]>]

Indeed!

Like I said, it would be a ridiculous design for MLS.
I was simply trying to understand the guarantees.

-Karthik

> On 22 Oct 2019, at 23:20, Richard Barnes <[e-mail]> wrote:
> 
> Just so we're clear, I would be *strongly* opposed to putting anything like this naïve UPKE scheme into MLS..  For the simple reason that it expands the size of Welcome message by a factor of K.  RTreeKEM or nothing :)
> 
> --Richard
> 
> 
> On Mon, Oct 21, 2019 at 6:53 PM Yevgeniy Dodis <[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
> Great summary, Karthik!
> 
> As I put in the other thread, comparison with the "naive" UPKE (for K=100 or less) might be a good idea.
> 
> Pros of Naive Scheme: 
> - more general, uses any PKE
> - using stream ciphers to generate K key pairs as needed makes the efficiency hit noticeably less than a factor of K,
> and perhaps closer to a factor of 2 (see below), but unclear a-priori.
> - for K>1, offers non-trivial (but still sub-optimal) security enhancement over basic TreeKEM (K=1)
> 
> Cons (pros of RTreeKEM):
> - Public key storage increases by at least factor of K
> - While the naive use increases secret storage and computation by a factor of K, using stream cipher, after i uses one can only store the 
> current seed to generate last (K-i) keys. However, K public keys should be published right away, so we must 
> lose at least factor of 2 compared to TreeKEM to generate all keys twice (but possibly factor of K if people update too frequently, so all but 
> 1 of the K keys gets used). So overall efficiency hit between 2 and K, which might already be comparable or worse than RTreeKEM.
> - Still much worse security than RTreeKEM, but possibly more expensive too, already for small K!
> 
> Please let us know if you think this should be explored further.
> Yevgeniy
> 
> On Mon, Oct 21, 2019 at 8:03 AM Karthikeyan Bhargavan <[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
> I see. So, here’s how I read the improvements proposed in RTreeKEM.
> 
> Currently, in TreeKEM (like in ART before it) we rely on each member to regularly *send* updates in order to get both PCS and FS for the group secrets.
> The informal secrecy guarantees we get are that:
> - (FS) if member A sends an update in epoch N (moving the epoch to N+1), and if A gets compromised in epoch N+1, the messages sent in epoch N remain secret
> - (PCS) if member A sends an update in epoch N (moving the epoch to N+1), and if A was (passively) compromised in epoch N, the messages sent in epoch N+1 remain secret
> In other words, each member who sends an update gets local protection against compromise, encouraging vulnerable members to keep sending updates..
> 
> However, as Joel, Sandro, Yevgeniy, and Yiannis note in their paper, we could do better, at least for FS, if we use one-time decryption keys.
> If each recipient deletes the old decryption key after processing an update, then even just by *processing* an update, we get an additional  guarantee:
> - (FS’) if member A processes an update in epoch N (moving the epoch to N+1), and if A gets compromised in epoch N+1, the messages sent in epoch N remain secret
> 
> It is also worth remembering that Signal also has a notion of one-time prekeys that work similarly for new messaging sessions.
> Although the following would be a bit ridiculous to use in large dynamic groups, here  is a sketch to achieve the receiver FS guarantee without the need for new crypto.
> - Every time a member A sends an update, it generates fresh node secrets for nodes on the path from A to the root
> - From each node secret, A generates a large number K (= 100) private-public encryption keypairs and sends the public keys with the update..
> - On receiving the update, each member B stores all K public keys for each node in its co-path
> - Each of these public keys can be used only once for sending an update, after which the private key is deleted from all recipients.
> - The last public key at each node is not deleted; it can only be replaced when one of the members under that node sends a new update (with a fresh batch of public keys)..
> 
> As far as I understand, the above scheme can be seen as an (inefficient) implementation of UPKE, right?
> Of course, it increases the size of each update by K, and only provides FS for K updates, after which some member has to send an update.
> Conversely, it does not require any new crypto algorithm. Is this a good baseline to compare UPKE schemes against?
> 
> If I am mis-reading something, do let me know!
> 
> -Karthik
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> On 17 Oct 2019, at 17:18, Joel Alwen <[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
>> 
>> I think the challenge with the hash-forward approach is how to do that
>> homomorphically. I.e. what we need are two algorithms; one to refresh
>> the PK without knowing the SK (but possibly knowing a secret
>> rerandomizer delta if needed) and one to update SK (again possibly using
>> delta). So to use a hash-forward approach their must be:
>> 
>> 1) a way to evolve PK forward to PK' and
>> 2) a *one-way* method to evolve SK forward to SK' compatible PK'.
>> 
>> One-wayness is what gives us Forward Secrecy and "compatibility" between
>> the two key evolution methods is what allows for asynchronous (i.e. 1
>> packet) updates.
>> 
>> Currently we use a secret re-randomizer delta to ensure the SK update
>> method is one-way. That is, without the delta you cant "undo" the
>> update. But that would break if we (at least naively) used some public
>> delta, say hash(ciphertext). So I think this is the challenge that we'd
>> have to overcome.. Basically, make sure we SK evolution is one-way but
>> also compatible the public evolution of PK.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Now one way sweet way to get all this (and more) would be to use a HIBE.
>> 
>> Initial, PK for a ratchet tree node (i.e. its "identity" since this is a
>> HIBE now) is simply the empty vector PK := () while the secret key is
>> the master public key for a fresh HIBE instance SK := MSK. We also
>> include, as a second component of the nodes PK, the master public key
>> PK_0 = MPK. To "hash forward" / "re-randomize" when sending a ciphertext
>> C to that node we can do:
>> 
>> PK' := (PK, hash(C)).
>> SK' := DeriveHIBEKey(PK, SK).
>> 
>> So simply append hash(C) to the identity for that node and derive the
>> corresponding HIBE key.
>> 
>> Ignoring the problems with using HIBE for a second, this is a very cool
>> solution. We don't need to send out the updated PK since everyone in the
>> group (and even the adversary) can compute it for themselves. We also
>> dont need a re-randomize delta as part of the plaintext because we're
>> using delta := hash(ciphertext) so the plaintext is shorter again.
>> Moreover, HIBE security means that learning SK' doesn't tell you
>> anything interesting about SK. In particular, we have forward security.
>> (In fact, FS will hold even if hash(C) were chosen *completely*
>> adversarially, say, as part of a malicious update in an insider attack!)
>> 
>> Of course, the problem with this solution is that we're using HIBE.
>> Worse, with unbounded depth because each new ciphertext sent to a node
>> results in going one depth further into the hierarchy. AFAIK all HIBE
>> constructions have pretty horrible (read exponential) efficiency as a
>> function of their depth. (And I won't mention the state of
>> standardization and open implementations for HIBE.)
>> 
>> Now there could be a totally different approach that entirly avoids
>> HIBE. But even with this approach there's at least some glimer of hope
>> to improve on it because, if we don't wory about insider attacks we can
>> assume C is honestly generated which means hash(C) really has a ton of
>> entropy. So we dont seem to need the full expresivity HIBE identities
>> allow us. Rather we only need HIBE for "random" identities. Still, that
>> seems like a pretty slim hope for major efficiency improvement. It also
>> doesn't do anything to address the lack of implementations and standards.
>> 
>> - Joël
>> 
>> On 17/10/2019 16:37, Karthik Bhargavan wrote:
>>> Thanks Yevgeniy,
>>> 
>>> This helps a lot.
>>> 
>>> To further my understanding, another question:
>>> 
>>>>  Intuitively, the sender will not only encrypt the message, but also a
>>>> random Delta value. It will change public key using homomorthism by
>>>> multiplying with g^Delta (in specific DH based scheme), while the
>>>> recipient will decrypt Delta (using old secret key), and add it to the
>>>> old secret key to get there new one. So now corrupting (old sk plus
>>>> Delta) will not help decrypting the ciphertext just decepted, emailing
>>>> forward secrecy. 
>>> 
>>> I see that in the DH-based scheme, this Delta needs to be private,
>>> otherwise the adversary can compute sk once it knows sk+Delta.
>>> But, in general, is it possible to conceive of a UPKE scheme where the
>>> recipient effectively “hashes forward” its symmetric key,
>>> where this one way hash-forward function does not have to rely on an
>>> externally chosen secret value?
>>> 
>>> Best,
>>> Karthik
>>> 
>>>> This is the high level, hope it makes sense.
>>>> Thanks for your question,
>>>> Yevgeniy
>>>> 
>>>> On Thu, Oct 17, 2019, 1:43 AM Karthik Bhargavan
>>>> <[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>
>>>> <mailto:[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>>> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>    Hi Joel,
>>>> 
>>>>    This looks very interesting. It is new to me since I was not at
>>>>    the interim.
>>>>    After reading the paper and the slides, I am still a bit fuzzy
>>>>    about what the recipient of an update needs to do.
>>>> 
>>>>    For example, for the running example in your slide deck, it would
>>>>    help if I could see:
>>>>    - what secret keys does each leaf need to keep
>>>>    - how do these secrets change when an update from some other node
>>>>    is received.
>>>>    Just working this out for one update is enough.
>>>> 
>>>>    I know that this is made precise in the eprint, but it would be
>>>>    faster if you could help us understand it :)
>>>> 
>>>>    Best,
>>>>    Karthik
>>>> 
>>>>> On 16 Oct 2019, at 23:51, Joel Alwen <[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>
>>>>    <mailto:[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>>> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> <FS-TreeKEM.pdf>
>>>> 
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>>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
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>> 
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